Megee v. Carmine
290 Mich. App. 551, 802 N.W.2d 669 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A military spouse remains financially responsible to compensate a former spouse for their court-ordered share of retirement pay when the military spouse makes a unilateral, post-judgment election to waive that retirement pay in favor of disability benefits.
Facts:
- Ronald A. Megee and Joan C. Megee divorced in 1989 after being married since 1966.
- Their divorce judgment awarded Joan a 50% interest in Ronald's U.S. Navy disposable retirement pay as part of the property division.
- A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) incorporated into the judgment prohibited Ronald from making any other benefit election that would reduce Joan's monthly allotment without her written consent.
- Ronald served in the Navy, including combat in Vietnam where he was exposed to Agent Orange.
- In 2008, Ronald was officially determined to be disabled as a result of his combat-related service.
- Following his disability determination, Ronald elected to receive Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC).
- To receive CRSC, Ronald had to waive his Navy retirement pay, which resulted in the cessation of payments to Joan.
Procedural Posture:
- Defendant Joan C. Megee filed a motion in the trial court to enforce the 1989 divorce judgment and the associated Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).
- The trial court granted the motion, ordering Plaintiff Ronald A. Megee to act as a trustee for the benefit of Defendant with respect to half of his monthly CRSC and to deliver those funds to her.
- Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied.
- Plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the trial court's order to the Michigan Court of Appeals by leave granted, with Defendant acting as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a military spouse remain financially responsible to compensate a former spouse for their share of military retirement pay, as awarded in a divorce judgment, when the military spouse unilaterally makes a post-judgment election to waive that retirement pay in favor of combat-related disability benefits?
Opinions:
Majority - Murphy, C.J.
Yes. A military spouse remains financially responsible to compensate a former spouse for their share of retirement pay when that pay is waived post-judgment for disability benefits. The court distinguished this case from the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, which held that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) preempts state courts from dividing retirement pay waived to receive Title 38 VA disability benefits. The court reasoned that Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) is a Title 10 benefit, not a Title 38 benefit, and thus is not covered by the specific exclusionary language in the USFSPA that Mansell relied upon. Therefore, the waived retirement pay remains divisible. Moreover, the court held that it is not dividing the CRSC itself, but is enforcing the original divorce judgment by ordering Ronald to pay Joan an amount equal to her share of the waived retirement pay. This compensation can come from any source Ronald chooses and is a remedy for his violation of the divorce judgment, which explicitly forbade him from unilaterally making an election that would reduce Joan's share.
Analysis:
This decision aligns Michigan with the overwhelming majority of state jurisdictions that provide a remedy for a non-military spouse when their share of a military pension is eliminated by the military spouse's post-divorce waiver. The court establishes that its order is not an impermissible division of disability benefits, but rather an enforcement of the original, vested property rights established in the divorce decree. This creates a durable obligation on the military spouse to make the former spouse whole from any available assets, preventing the military spouse from using federal disability law to unilaterally modify a final state court property division.
