McQuiggin v. Perkins
569 U.S. (2013)
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Rule of Law:
A credible claim of actual innocence serves as a gateway to federal habeas review for a state prisoner's constitutional claims, allowing a court to hear an otherwise time-barred petition filed after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
Facts:
- On March 4, 1993, Floyd Perkins, Rodney Henderson, and Damarr Jones attended a party together in Flint, Michigan, and left in the same group.
- Later that night, Henderson was found murdered by stab wounds on a wooded trail.
- Perkins was charged with Henderson's murder.
- At trial, Jones served as the key prosecution witness, testifying that he saw Perkins alone commit the murder.
- Another witness, Chauncey Vaughn, testified that Perkins had previously threatened to kill Henderson and later confessed to him over the phone.
- A third witness, Torriano Player, testified that Perkins expressed regret for the killing to him.
- Perkins testified in his own defense, stating that he had left Henderson and Jones to go to a store and, upon returning, saw Jones with blood on his pants, shoes, and coat.
Procedural Posture:
- Floyd Perkins was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury in a Michigan state trial court and sentenced to life in prison on October 27, 1993.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- The Michigan Supreme Court, the state's highest court, denied Perkins's petition for leave to appeal, and his conviction became final on May 5, 1997.
- On June 13, 2008, more than 11 years later, Perkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court, alleging his trial counsel was ineffective.
- The District Court denied the petition as untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, finding Perkins was not entitled to equitable tolling and had not made a credible showing of actual innocence.
- Perkins (appellant) appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit against the Warden, McQuiggin (appellee).
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that a credible claim of actual innocence allows a petitioner to overcome the AEDPA time bar regardless of the petitioner's diligence in bringing the claim.
- The Warden, McQuiggin, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a credible claim of actual innocence allow a federal habeas petitioner to overcome the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes. A convincing showing of actual innocence serves as an equitable exception to overcome the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. This "actual innocence gateway" is a fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, grounded in the equitable discretion of habeas courts to ensure federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. The Court reasoned that this exception, previously applied to judge-made procedural bars like procedural default, should not be withheld for a statutory time bar, as it would be 'passing strange' to give a federal deadline more force than a state deadline. Although a petitioner does not need to show diligence as a precondition to invoking the exception, a court must consider any unjustifiable delay as a factor when assessing the reliability and credibility of the petitioner's new evidence of innocence. The standard remains the demanding one from Schlup v. Delo: the petitioner must show that in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No. The Court has no constitutional authority to create an exception to a clear and categorical statutory command enacted by Congress. The "actual innocence" exception has historically been applied only to judge-made, prudential barriers to habeas relief (like procedural default), not to statutory bars created by law. The AEDPA statute provides a comprehensive scheme, including a specific provision, § 2244(d)(1)(D), for claims based on newly discovered evidence, which itself requires diligence. By inventing an extra-statutory exception, the Court usurps the legislative power of Congress and renders its carefully crafted scheme superfluous. Furthermore, where Congress intended an innocence exception in AEDPA, it wrote one explicitly with a higher, "clear and convincing" evidence standard, implying no other, more lenient exception was intended for the statute of limitations.
Analysis:
This decision formally extends the 'actual innocence' or 'miscarriage of justice' gateway, previously applied to common-law procedural bars, to overcome a statutory one—the AEDPA statute of limitations. It establishes that the equitable principle of preventing the continued incarceration of an innocent person can, in extraordinary cases, override strict congressional timelines. The ruling distinguishes this 'equitable exception' from 'equitable tolling,' which requires a showing of diligence. By making the petitioner's delay a key factor in assessing the credibility of the innocence claim itself, the Court creates a flexible standard that avoids a rigid diligence prerequisite while still discouraging prisoners from strategically delaying their claims.
