McPadden v. Sidhu
964 A.2d 1262, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 123, 2008 WL 4017052 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Under Delaware law, a board's grossly negligent conduct, constituting a breach of the duty of care, does not, without more, rise to the level of bad faith conduct, which constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty. Directors protected by a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision in the corporate charter are therefore shielded from personal monetary liability for acts of gross negligence.
Facts:
- i2 Technologies, Inc. ('i2') decided to sell its wholly owned subsidiary, Trade Services Corporation ('TSC').
- A competitor, VIS/ME, had previously informed i2 directors and TSC vice president Anthony Dubreville of its interest in acquiring TSC for up to $25 million.
- The i2 board of directors tasked Dubreville with managing the sale process for TSC, despite knowing that he was interested in leading a management buyout of the subsidiary himself.
- Dubreville conducted a limited marketing process for TSC, providing manipulated financial projections and failing to solicit bids from any of TSC's direct competitors, including VIS/ME.
- Dubreville’s management group, TSH, offered to purchase TSC for $3 million, an offer the i2 board approved based on a flawed process and a fairness opinion derived from buyer-provided projections.
- Approximately two years after the sale, after rejecting an $18.5 million offer as too low, TSH sold TSC to another company for over $25 million.
Procedural Posture:
- A shareholder plaintiff initiated a derivative action on behalf of i2 Technologies, Inc. in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
- The complaint alleged breach of fiduciary duty against the Director Defendants and officer Anthony Dubreville, and unjust enrichment against Dubreville.
- The plaintiff did not make a pre-suit demand on the board, asserting that demand was excused for futility.
- All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and Chancery Rule 23.1 for failure to plead facts excusing demand.
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Issue:
Does a board of directors' grossly negligent conduct in approving the sale of a corporate subsidiary, without more, constitute bad faith sufficient to overcome the protections of a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision in the company's charter?
Opinions:
Majority - Chancellor Chandler
No. A board's grossly negligent conduct does not constitute bad faith and is therefore protected by a § 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision. The court distinguishes between a breach of the duty of care (gross negligence) and a breach of the duty of loyalty (bad faith). The court found the Director Defendants' actions—placing a conflicted officer in charge of a sale, failing to provide any oversight, and ignoring obvious red flags—constituted gross negligence because their behavior was recklessly indifferent or unreasonable. However, the plaintiff failed to plead particularized facts showing the directors acted with a 'conscious disregard for their duties,' which is the standard for bad faith. Because i2's charter contained a § 102(b)(7) provision exculpating directors from monetary damages for breaches of the duty of care, the claims against them must be dismissed. In contrast, the officer, Dubreville, is not protected by the § 102(b)(7) provision, so the breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment claims against him may proceed.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the high bar for pleading bad faith sufficient to overcome a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision in a company's charter. It demonstrates that even 'egregious' and 'puzzling' failures of directorial process, amounting to gross negligence, are insufficient to establish bad faith. The decision reinforces the distinction drawn in In re Walt Disney and Stone v. Ritter, requiring plaintiffs to show an 'intentional dereliction of duty' or a 'conscious disregard for one's responsibilities' to strip directors of exculpatory protection. This holding underscores the power of exculpatory clauses in shielding directors from liability for even serious process-related failures, thereby channeling liability towards acts of disloyalty or intentional misconduct.

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