McNeil v. Wisconsin
501 U.S. 171 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
The invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which is offense-specific, does not constitute an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda for police-initiated interrogation regarding unrelated, uncharged offenses.
Facts:
- Paul McNeil was arrested in Omaha, Nebraska, pursuant to a warrant for an armed robbery in West Allis, Wisconsin.
- Upon his arrest, Milwaukee deputies advised McNeil of his Miranda rights; he refused to answer questions but did not request a lawyer.
- Back in Wisconsin, McNeil appeared before a court commissioner on the West Allis armed robbery charge and was represented by a public defender.
- Later that evening, Detective Joseph Butts visited McNeil in jail to question him about separate crimes: a murder, attempted murder, and armed burglary in Caledonia, Wisconsin.
- Butts advised McNeil of his Miranda rights, which McNeil waived in writing before the interview began.
- During this and two subsequent interviews over the next two days, each preceded by a new Miranda warning and written waiver, McNeil made incriminating statements confessing to the Caledonia crimes.
Procedural Posture:
- After being charged for the Caledonia crimes, Paul McNeil filed a pretrial motion to suppress his three incriminating statements in the Wisconsin trial court.
- The trial court denied the motion.
- McNeil was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and armed robbery.
- McNeil, as appellant, appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred by not suppressing the statements.
- The Court of Appeals certified the question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
- The Wisconsin Supreme Court, with the State as appellee, answered 'no' to the certified question and affirmed the trial court's decision.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted McNeil's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does an accused's invocation of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a judicial proceeding for a charged offense also constitute an invocation of their Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel, thereby precluding police-initiated interrogation on unrelated, uncharged offenses?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. An accused's invocation of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a judicial proceeding for a charged offense does not also constitute an invocation of their non-offense-specific Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific and attaches only to the particular crime for which formal judicial proceedings have begun. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right is to provide assistance during critical confrontations with the government after formal charges are filed. In contrast, the purpose of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right is to protect a suspect's desire to deal with the police only through counsel during custodial interrogation. To invoke the Miranda right, a suspect must make a statement that can reasonably be construed as an expression of a desire for an attorney's assistance in dealing with police interrogation; requesting counsel at a bail hearing for a specific charge does not meet this standard. Adopting the petitioner's proposed rule would seriously impede law enforcement by making most persons in custody for one crime unapproachable by police investigating other crimes, even if the suspect is willing to talk.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The Court's creation of an 'offense-specific' limitation on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel demeans the right and is contrary to precedent like Michigan v. Jackson, which requires a broad interpretation of a defendant's request for counsel. An average person does not understand the 'subtle distinctions' between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights; when they request an attorney from a judge, it is a commonsense indication that they do not wish to deal with their 'adversaries singlehandedly' in any context, including police interrogation. The majority's narrow construction of the right to counsel rejects this reality and reflects a preference for an inquisitorial system of justice that views defense lawyers as impediments rather than essential components of the adversarial process. The practical effect is to generate confusion and undermine the bright-line rule established in Edwards v. Arizona.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No. The majority is correct that the invocation of the Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific. The jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel should be brought into logical alignment with this principle. The protection of Edwards v. Arizona, which prevents police from reinitiating contact after a suspect invokes the right to counsel, should also be offense-specific. Therefore, even if McNeil had invoked his Fifth Amendment right regarding the armed robbery, authorities should not have been prohibited from questioning him about the unrelated Caledonia offenses.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the distinction between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, establishing the Sixth Amendment right as strictly offense-specific. It gives law enforcement a clear path to question suspects who are in custody and represented by counsel for one crime about other, unrelated criminal activities. The ruling places the burden squarely on the defendant to explicitly invoke their Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel for custodial interrogation, as a request for counsel at a judicial proceeding is insufficient to provide this broader, non-offense-specific protection. This prevents the Sixth Amendment right from acting as a blanket shield against all future police questioning once a defendant is formally charged with any crime.
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