McNeal v. Robinson
628 P.2d 358 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A non-custodial parent ordered to pay child support may receive an equitable credit against support arrearages for periods when the child resided with them, provided the custodial parent consented to this arrangement and allowing the credit would not be unjust.
Facts:
- Sheryl Robinson and Gary McNeal divorced in 1973, with Sheryl awarded custody of their two minor children, Denise and Dennis.
- The divorce decree ordered Gary to pay $75 per child per month in child support.
- In January 1977, Dennis moved in with Gary, who then reduced his child support payments to $75 per month.
- In April 1977, Denise also moved in with Gary, at which point he ceased all child support payments.
- Denise lived with Gary for 19 months, and Dennis lived with him for 23 months.
- In November 1978, Denise moved back with Sheryl, and Gary resumed paying $75 per month for her support.
- Sheryl did not file a legal complaint regarding the non-payment of support for at least one and a half years.
Procedural Posture:
- Sheryl Robinson filed an application in the trial court to modify the divorce decree to increase child support and sought a contempt citation against Gary McNeal for arrearages.
- Gary McNeal cross-petitioned for retroactive modification of his support obligation and for permanent custody of the children.
- The trial court found Gary innocent of contempt but ordered him to pay the entire child support arrearage of $3,440.00, denying any credit for the time the children lived with him.
- The trial court also granted Gary custody of the son, Dennis, and increased the child support for the daughter, Denise.
- Gary McNeal, as appellant, appealed the trial court's ruling on the arrearage to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does equity permit a non-custodial parent to receive credit against court-ordered child support arrearages for periods when the children resided with that parent, even without a formal modification of the custody and support decree?
Opinions:
Majority - Doolin, J.
Yes. While courts generally prohibit retroactive modification of child support, equity allows for a credit against arrearages for periods when the payor parent, with the other parent's consent, had custody of the children. The court reasoned that child support is for the benefit of the children, and forcing Gary to pay Sheryl for periods when he was directly supporting the children in his own home would be inequitable, amounting to double payment. The court found Sheryl's failure to complain for over a year and a half constituted implied consent to the arrangement. This credit is not automatic but may be granted where the equities of the specific situation dictate, particularly where the custodial parent cannot show they incurred ongoing expenses for the children in anticipation of their return.
Dissenting - Simms, J.
No. A court should not create an exception to the rule against retroactive modification of child support decrees. The dissent argued that allowing such a credit encourages parties to disregard court orders and engage in self-help rather than seeking proper prospective modification. The dissenter contended that the prerequisites for an equitable exception—either compulsion of circumstances or clear consent—were not met, and that the mother's delay in filing for contempt should not be interpreted as implied consent. Creating a vague, equity-based exception will lead to 'continuous trouble and turmoil' and undermine the authority of judicial decrees.
Analysis:
This case represents a significant shift in Oklahoma family law, moving from a rigid rule against retroactive modification of child support to a more flexible, equity-based approach. It establishes that a parent's direct fulfillment of the support obligation by caring for the child can satisfy a court-ordered payment under certain conditions. The decision prioritizes the substance of child support (the child's welfare) over the form of payment dictated by the decree. Future litigation in this area will likely focus on defining the boundaries of 'implied consent' and what constitutes an 'injustice' to the custodial parent that would prevent such a credit.
