McMillan v. Pennsylvania
477 U.S. 79 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A state legislature may define a fact that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence as a sentencing factor, rather than an element of the crime, so long as it does not increase the maximum penalty authorized for the offense. Proving this sentencing factor by a preponderance of the evidence at a sentencing hearing does not violate the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Facts:
- Petitioner McMillan shot a victim in the buttock following an argument over a debt.
- Petitioner Peterson shot and killed her husband.
- Petitioner Dennison shot and seriously wounded an acquaintance.
- Petitioner Smalls robbed a seafood store at gunpoint.
- Each petitioner was convicted of a felony enumerated in Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act.
- The Act provides that a person convicted of one of these felonies must receive a minimum sentence of five years if the sentencing judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person visibly possessed a firearm during the offense.
Procedural Posture:
- Four separate petitioners were convicted of enumerated felonies in Pennsylvania trial courts.
- At each sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sought the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence under the Act.
- The respective sentencing judges in each case found the Act to be unconstitutional and imposed sentences lower than the five-year minimum.
- The Commonwealth appealed all four cases to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania consolidated the appeals, reversed the trial courts' decisions, and held that the Act was constitutional.
- The court vacated the petitioners' sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing in accordance with the Act.
- The petitioners (McMillan, Peterson, Dennison, and Smalls) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a Pennsylvania statute that requires a judge to impose a mandatory minimum sentence, based on a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. The Pennsylvania statute is constitutional because it treats visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor, not an element of the underlying offense. The Due Process Clause does not require facts that influence sentencing discretion within a prescribed statutory range to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reasoned that the state legislature's definition of the elements of an offense is generally dispositive. Here, the Act does not alter the maximum penalty for the crime, create a separate offense, or relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove guilt for the underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike in Mullaney v. Wilbur, where a finding altered the degree of the crime and the sentencing range, this Act merely limits the court's discretion within the already established range by setting a mandatory minimum. Furthermore, because visible possession is a sentencing consideration, there is no Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine that fact.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
Yes. The statute violates the Due Process Clause. The Court should not abdicate its responsibility to determine what constitutes an element of a crime to state legislatures. When a state attaches a special stigma and a special, mandatory punishment to a specific component of a prohibited act, that component must be treated as an element of the crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The legislature's label is not controlling; the functional effect of the finding is what matters. The majority's deference to the Pennsylvania legislature's declaration that visible possession is not an element is inappropriate and undermines the protections of In re Winship.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The statute is unconstitutional. If a state provides that a specific component of a prohibited transaction gives rise to both a special stigma and a special punishment, that component must be treated as a 'fact necessary to constitute the crime' under In re Winship and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority errs by allowing a legislature to avoid this constitutional requirement simply by labeling a fact a 'sentencing factor.' The distinction in Patterson v. New York between elements and mitigating affirmative defenses does not apply here, as visible possession is an aggravating factor that substantially increases the mandatory punishment. For petitioner Dennison, the finding more than doubled his maximum possible sentence, demonstrating that it functions as an element of a more serious offense.
Analysis:
This decision established the influential but later-criticized distinction between 'elements' of a crime and 'sentencing factors.' It granted state legislatures significant authority to structure criminal statutes by channeling certain factual determinations to judges at sentencing under a lower burden of proof, as long as the statutory maximum sentence was not affected. This framework heavily influenced the creation of mandatory minimum sentencing schemes and sentencing guidelines. However, the holding's core logic was significantly eroded and ultimately overruled by a subsequent line of cases starting with Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held that any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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