McLaughlin v. Florida
379 U.S. 184 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute that criminalizes conduct for an unmarried interracial couple but not for an unmarried couple of the same race constitutes an invidious discrimination based on race, which violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- A Black man and a white woman, who were not married to each other, resided in Florida.
- The couple habitually lived in and occupied the same room during the nighttime.
- Florida Statute § 798.05 specifically criminalized this conduct only when it involved a Black person and a white person.
- Other Florida statutes criminalized adultery and fornication for all persons regardless of race, but these laws required proof of sexual intercourse, which § 798.05 did not.
- The statute in question, § 798.05, did not apply to unmarried couples of the same race who engaged in the same conduct.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellants, a white woman and a Black man, were charged in a Florida trial court with violating Fla. Stat. § 798.05.
- The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court overruled the appellants' constitutional objections.
- The appellants appealed their conviction to the Florida Supreme Court.
- The Florida Supreme Court, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Pace v. Alabama, affirmed the conviction and upheld the statute's constitutionality.
- The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which noted probable jurisdiction to hear the case.
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Issue:
Does a Florida statute that makes it a criminal offense for a white person and a Black person of the opposite sex, who are not married to each other, to habitually occupy the same room at night violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
Yes, the Florida statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. A law that makes conduct criminal based solely on the race of the participants is an unconstitutional racial classification. The Court's prior decision in Pace v. Alabama, which permitted such laws as long as both parties to the interracial relationship were punished equally, represents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause that has been abandoned. Modern equal protection jurisprudence requires that any classification must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Racial classifications are 'constitutionally suspect' and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' meaning they must be justified by an overriding statutory purpose. Florida's stated purpose of preventing illicit sexual conduct is not sufficient justification, as the state already has race-neutral statutes that prohibit such conduct for all persons. There is no rational basis to believe that promiscuity by an interracial couple is a greater evil than promiscuity by a couple of the same race. The law is not necessary to uphold the state's anti-miscegenation statute and is therefore an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Concurring - Justice Harlan
Yes. The proper test for a law that impinges on fundamental rights through racial discrimination is necessity, not mere rational relationship. The state has not shown that the cohabitation statute is necessary to uphold its anti-miscegenation law, especially given the existence of non-discriminatory statutes targeting extramarital relations. Because the prohibition of racial discrimination lies at the very heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, the necessity test developed for First Amendment cases is equally applicable here.
Concurring - Justice Stewart
Yes. The Court's opinion correctly invalidates the law but wrongly implies that an 'overriding statutory purpose' could potentially justify such a criminal statute. It is impossible to conceive of a valid legislative purpose under the Constitution for a law that makes the criminality of an act dependent upon the race of the actor. A law that punishes individuals based on the color of their skin is not just suspect; it is invidious per se and can never be constitutional.
Analysis:
This case marked a significant departure from the precedent set in Pace v. Alabama, formally rejecting the narrow view that equal punishment for both parties in an interracial relationship satisfies the Equal Protection Clause. By applying a heightened standard of review (strict scrutiny) to a criminal statute with a racial classification, the Court strongly affirmed that such laws are constitutionally suspect. This decision was a critical step in dismantling state-sponsored racial discrimination and directly foreshadowed the Court's landmark ruling in Loving v. Virginia (1967), which struck down all state laws banning interracial marriage.
