McLaughlin v. Copeland
455 F. Supp. 749, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17164 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged if they are pertinent to the proceeding, and this privilege bars not only defamation claims but also any other tort claims, such as malicious interference with business or civil conspiracy, that are predicated on the same privileged communication.
Facts:
- Francis X. McLaughlin, an attorney, represented a creditor of Lammot du Pont Copeland Jr. in a bankruptcy proceeding.
- E. Norman Veasey, an attorney with his law firm, represented Copeland Jr. in that same bankruptcy proceeding.
- McLaughlin investigated and alleged that Copeland Jr. and his father, Copeland Sr., had engaged in fraudulent activities and informed Veasey of his intent to file a class action lawsuit.
- McLaughlin also told Veasey he planned to submit his findings to a congressional committee for referral to law enforcement.
- In February 1975, Veasey and McLaughlin met in Baltimore, ostensibly to discuss a settlement. McLaughlin alleged Veasey's real purpose was to entrap him into committing a professional ethics violation.
- Following the meeting, Veasey prepared a memorandum alleging that McLaughlin had committed the crime of extortion and violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
- Veasey sent this memorandum and an explanatory letter dated March 5th to the judge presiding over the bankruptcy proceeding.
- Veasey also sent copies of the March 5th letter to the other attorneys of record in the bankruptcy case.
Procedural Posture:
- Francis X. McLaughlin filed suit against the defendants in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland (a state trial court).
- Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.
- Defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction.
- The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland found it lacked jurisdiction over one defendant and transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.
- After the judges of the District of Delaware recused themselves, the Chief Justice assigned the case to the authoring judge.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
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Issue:
Does the absolute privilege for statements made during a judicial proceeding extend to bar claims for libel, malicious interference with business, and civil conspiracy that are based on those same statements?
Opinions:
Majority - Blair, District Judge
Yes. The absolute privilege for statements made during a judicial proceeding bars claims for libel, malicious interference with business, and civil conspiracy that are based on those statements. The court reasoned that there is a strong public policy in favor of allowing participants in judicial proceedings to speak and write freely without fear of subsequent litigation. Veasey's letter to the judge was pertinent to the bankruptcy proceeding and therefore absolutely privileged. This privilege extends to copies sent to other counsel of record, as this is a standard part of litigation, not a waiver of the privilege. Because the privilege is absolute, it cannot be circumvented by re-characterizing a defamation claim as a different tort, such as malicious interference with business. Finally, since the underlying act (the letter) is privileged and not actionable, it cannot form the basis of a civil conspiracy claim, which requires an underlying unlawful act.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the breadth of the absolute privilege for communications made in a judicial proceeding. It clarifies that the privilege is not merely a defense to defamation but a complete immunity that bars any tort claim arising from the same privileged statement. By preventing plaintiffs from 'drafting around' the privilege by pleading alternative tort theories like malicious interference or conspiracy, the court protects the core policy of ensuring zealous advocacy and open communication within the justice system. This precedent makes it significantly more difficult for parties to use retaliatory litigation to punish opposing counsel or parties for statements made during a case.
