McKnight v. State
2008 S.C. LEXIS 142, 661 S.E.2d 354, 378 S.C. 33 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Strickland test, a defense counsel's performance is constitutionally deficient if it falls below prevailing professional norms, such as by presenting an expert witness whose testimony bolsters the prosecution's case or failing to object to a confusing supplemental jury instruction, and this deficient performance prejudices the outcome of the trial.
Facts:
- In May 1999, Regina McKnight gave birth to a nearly full-term stillborn baby girl.
- An autopsy revealed the presence of benzoylecgonine (BZE), a by-product of cocaine, in the fetus.
- The autopsy report concluded that the death occurred due to 'chorioamnionitis, funisitis and cocaine consumption' and labeled the death a homicide.
- McKnight was subsequently charged with homicide by child abuse.
- During McKnight's first trial, her defense counsel presented two experts: Dr. Karch, who testified that natural causes alone were responsible for the death, and Dr. Conradi, who testified the cause was 'undetermined' but eliminated all natural causes, thereby implicitly pointing to cocaine.
- The State's closing argument in the first trial heavily relied on Dr. Conradi's testimony to bolster its case.
- At the second trial, McKnight's counsel chose not to call Dr. Karch (who was unavailable) or a substitute, and relied solely on the testimony of Dr. Conradi.
Procedural Posture:
- Regina McKnight was charged with homicide by child abuse.
- Her first trial in January 2001, in a South Carolina trial court, ended in a mistrial.
- Following a second trial in May 2001, a jury convicted McKnight of the charge.
- McKnight filed a direct appeal with the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which affirmed her conviction.
- McKnight then filed an application for post-conviction relief (PCR) in a lower court, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
- The PCR court denied her application for relief.
- The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted McKnight's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR court's decision.
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Issue:
Does a defense attorney provide ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial performance includes calling only an expert witness known to be detrimental to the defense, failing to object to a confusing supplemental jury instruction on the requisite mental state, and forgetting to introduce a key piece of exculpatory evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Toal
Yes. A defense attorney provides ineffective assistance of counsel when her trial performance falls below professional norms and prejudices the defendant's case. Here, counsel's performance was deficient on multiple grounds. First, counsel unreasonably chose to call a single expert witness (Dr. Conradi) at the second trial whose testimony was known to have bolstered the State's case in the first trial by eliminating all natural causes of death. Failing to secure alternative, favorable expert testimony, despite its availability, was not a valid trial strategy, especially when counsel's excuse was a heavy caseload. Second, counsel was deficient in failing to object to a confusing supplemental jury instruction on criminal intent, which improperly equated the high standard of 'extreme indifference to human life' with lower standards like 'negligence.' The jury's confusion was evident from their question, and their swift return of a guilty verdict after the confusing recharge indicates prejudice. Finally, counsel was deficient for 'just forgetting' to introduce the autopsy report, which was a crucial piece of evidence that contradicted the State's theory that cocaine was the sole cause of death by listing two other contributing factors. The cumulative effect of these errors prejudiced McKnight's defense, creating a reasonable probability that the trial's outcome would have been different.
Analysis:
This case provides a detailed application of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard established in Strickland v. Washington. It clarifies that a lawyer's decisions are not shielded as 'trial strategy' if they result from inadequate investigation or preparation, rather than reasonable professional judgment. The ruling underscores the critical duty of counsel to present a coherent defense, which includes carefully vetting expert witnesses to ensure they support, rather than undermine, the defense's theory. Furthermore, it highlights the significance of supplemental jury instructions and a lawyer's duty to object to confusing charges, as they can have a disproportionate impact on a jury's deliberations and lead to prejudicial error.
