McKinney v. City of Middletown
49 F.4th 730 (2022)
Rule of Law:
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, police officers are shielded from liability for excessive force claims involving the combined use of a canine, baton, and taser against an actively resisting suspect unless existing precedent clearly establishes that such specific conduct is unlawful in the particular factual context presented. A plaintiff cannot overcome qualified immunity by relying on generalized Fourth Amendment principles when the specific deployment of force was responsive to the suspect's active resistance and threats.
Facts:
- Following an arrest for attempted robbery while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, William McKinney was detained in a holding cell at the Middletown Police Department.
- McKinney obstructed his cell camera with toilet paper and, after initially complying with a request to remove it, began cutting his wrist and forearm with an unknown object.
- When officers returned to address the camera obstruction, McKinney became hostile, refused commands, and threatened to 'fuck [the] cops up' if they entered.
- Officers decided to move McKinney to a padded cell, but McKinney blocked the door with a mattress and told them they would have to come in and get him.
- As officers opened the door, McKinney grabbed Officer Sebold’s baton, attempted to wrestle it away, and charged at the officers.
- In response to McKinney's charge, Officer D’Aresta deployed a police canine, Hunter, to bite McKinney’s leg.
- McKinney continued to fight and struggle with the officers while the dog maintained its hold and Officer Sebold struck McKinney with a baton.
- Officer Ward eventually deployed a taser to McKinney's shoulder, at which point McKinney ceased fighting, allowed himself to be handcuffed, and the dog was removed.
Procedural Posture:
- McKinney filed a Section 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging excessive force.
- The defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
- McKinney appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case, finding a jury could potentially conclude the force was excessive.
- On remand, the defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment specifically on the ground of qualified immunity.
- The District Court again granted summary judgment for the defendants, ruling the law was not clearly established.
- McKinney filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied.
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Issue:
Are police officers entitled to qualified immunity when they employ a police canine, baton, and taser to subdue an inmate who is actively resisting a cell transfer and attacking officers, where no binding precedent squarely prohibits that specific use of force under those circumstances?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Menashi
Yes, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because McKinney failed to identify clearly established law prohibiting the incremental force used in this specific scenario. The Court reasoned that generalized excessive force principles do not strictly govern the 'particular circumstances' of this case, where the inmate was actively resisting, threatening officers, and attempting to seize a weapon. Although McKinney argued the officers failed to warn him before releasing the dog and allowed the bite to last too long, the Court found that failing to warn during an immediate threat and maintaining a dog bite while a suspect continues to fight do not violate clearly established law. Furthermore, because McKinney formally admitted to the officers' version of events in the lower court (due to his own lack of memory), he could not later manufacture factual disputes about the timeline of his resistance. Therefore, a reasonable officer would not have known that using a baton, canine, and taser incrementally to subdue a violent inmate was unlawful.
Dissenting - Judge Calabresi
No, the officers should not be granted qualified immunity because a reasonable jury could find that the force used was excessive and violated clearly established law. The dissent argued that the majority improperly resolved factual ambiguities against the plaintiff, contradicting the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Specifically, a jury could infer that the dog attacked before McKinney offered significant resistance or continued attacking after he was effectively subdued, both of which would violate the established rule against using significant force on non-threatening suspects. Judge Calabresi also criticized the doctrine of qualified immunity generally, arguing it lacks historical basis and serves as an impediment to accountability that should be revisited by the Supreme Court or Congress.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the high hurdle plaintiffs face in overcoming qualified immunity in excessive force cases, particularly within the Second Circuit. By emphasizing that plaintiffs must find precedent that 'squarely governs' the specific facts—rather than relying on broad principles like 'do not use excessive force'—the court narrows the scope of liability for officers handling volatile situations. The ruling also highlights a critical procedural pitfall: plaintiffs are strictly bound by facts they admit to in Rule 56 statements, even if those admissions are made due to a lack of memory, preventing them from later arguing a different version of events to survive summary judgment. Additionally, the decision clarifies that the use of a police canine without a warning may be objectively reasonable if the suspect poses an immediate threat to officer safety.
