McKee v. Cosby
2017 WL 4675588, 874 F.3d 54, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20380 (2017)
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Rule of Law:
An individual who voluntarily injects themselves into a public controversy by making public accusations against a well-known person becomes a limited-purpose public figure. Such a figure cannot sustain a defamation claim for statements of opinion that are based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts, and must prove any allegedly false factual statements were made with actual malice.
Facts:
- Kathrine McKee, an actress, met entertainer William H. Cosby, Jr. around 1964 and socialized with him between 1971 and 1974.
- In 1974, Cosby invited McKee to his hotel room in Detroit, where he then forcibly raped her.
- In December 2014, after more than twenty other women had publicly accused Cosby of sexual assault, McKee gave an interview to the New York Daily News recounting the rape.
- On December 22, 2014, the Daily News published an article detailing McKee's allegations.
- On the same day, Cosby's attorney, Martin Singer, sent a six-page letter to the Daily News challenging McKee's credibility and the newspaper's journalistic standards.
- The letter cited publicly available information, including prior articles and quotes from McKee, to assert that her 'story lacks credibility.'
- Singer allegedly leaked the letter to the media, leading to its widespread dissemination online and in news outlets.
Procedural Posture:
- Kathrine McKee sued William H. Cosby, Jr. for defamation in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
- McKee filed an amended complaint containing twenty-four counts of defamation.
- Cosby filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
- The district court granted Cosby's motion to dismiss, finding the statements to be non-actionable under the First Amendment.
- McKee (Appellant) appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, with Cosby as the Appellee.
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Issue:
Does an attorney's letter, sent to a newspaper and subsequently leaked, constitute actionable defamation when it challenges the credibility of a limited-purpose public figure's sexual assault allegation by stating opinions based on disclosed, publicly available facts?
Opinions:
Majority - Lynch, Circuit Judge
No, the attorney's letter does not constitute actionable defamation. The court held that McKee became a limited-purpose public figure and failed to plausibly allege that the statements were defamatory or made with actual malice. The court reasoned that a 'public controversy' existed surrounding the numerous sexual assault allegations against Cosby, and McKee 'thrust' herself into it by voluntarily giving an interview to a major newspaper to influence the outcome. As a limited-purpose public figure, McKee had to prove that any defamatory falsehoods were made with 'actual malice'—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The court found the letter's core message—that McKee lacked credibility—was a protected opinion because it disclosed the underlying facts (citations and quotes from public sources) on which the opinion was based, allowing readers to draw their own conclusions. For specific statements, such as quoting McKee admitting to 'a lot of lying,' the court found that even if the context was omitted, the letter's inclusion of a hyperlink to the source article precluded a finding of actual malice. Other statements were deemed non-actionable subjective characterizations or generalized grievances not specifically 'concerning' McKee.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the significant burden on plaintiffs in defamation cases once they are classified as limited-purpose public figures. It establishes that actively participating in a pre-existing, high-profile public controversy by making public accusations qualifies a person for this status. The ruling provides substantial protection for speech critical of such public figures, particularly for statements of opinion where the factual basis is disclosed. Furthermore, the court's acceptance of a hyperlink as a means to provide context suggests a modern adaptation of defamation law, potentially making it harder to prove reckless disregard for the truth in the digital age when source material is readily accessible.
