McKee v. Cosby

Supreme Court of the United States
203 L. Ed. 2d 247, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

In a concurrence to the denial of certiorari, Justice Thomas argues that the 'actual malice' standard established in New York Times v. Sullivan for public figure defamation cases is a judicial invention without basis in the original meaning of the First or Fourteenth Amendments and should be reconsidered in a future case.

Facts:

In December 2014, Kathrine McKee publicly accused actor Bill Cosby of forcibly raping her approximately 40 years earlier.
In response, Cosby's attorney wrote and allegedly leaked a letter.
McKee alleged the letter contained defamatory statements that deliberately distorted her personal background.
McKee claimed the letter was intended to damage her reputation for truthfulness and to humiliate and intimidate her.
Excerpts from the allegedly defamatory letter were disseminated on the internet and published by news outlets.

Procedural Posture:

Kathrine McKee filed a defamation suit against Bill Cosby's agent in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
The district court (trial court) dismissed McKee's case, finding that she was a limited-purpose public figure and had failed to plead sufficient facts to show actual malice.
McKee (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
The Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court) affirmed the district court's dismissal.
McKee (petitioner) filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, asking it to review the Court of Appeals' decision.

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Issue:

Does the First Amendment, as originally understood, require public figures to prove that a defamatory statement was made with 'actual malice' to recover damages in a state-law defamation suit?

Opinions:

Concurring in the denial of certiorari - Justice Thomas

No. The First Amendment, as originally understood, does not require public figures to satisfy the actual-malice standard in state-law defamation suits. The Court's reasoning is as follows: The actual-malice rule from New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny are 'policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law' with no grounding in the original meaning of the Constitution. Before 1964, defamation law was almost exclusively a matter for the states. The common law at the time the First and Fourteenth Amendments were ratified did not require public figures to meet a heightened standard; in fact, libels against public figures were often considered more serious than those against private individuals. The historical record indicates that the First Amendment was not understood to displace the common law of libel. The New York Times Court's reliance on opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798 is misplaced because that act was a federal criminal statute punishing criticism of the government, not a law governing private civil defamation suits. Therefore, the Court should reconsider its jurisprudence in this area and return the regulation of libel to the states.

Analysis:

This opinion, while not a binding holding of the Court, is legally significant as a direct and detailed challenge to the foundational First Amendment precedent of New York Times v. Sullivan. It serves as a jurisprudential roadmap for future litigants seeking to overturn the actual-malice standard. If the Court were to adopt this reasoning in a future majority opinion, it would represent a radical shift in defamation law, making it substantially easier for public officials and figures to sue media outlets, critics, and individuals for libel. This could potentially chill speech critical of public figures and reshape the balance between protecting reputation and ensuring robust public discourse.

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