McKaine v. State
170 S.W.3d 285, 2005 WL 2090885, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7147 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
In Texas, juvenile courts may waive jurisdiction and transfer a minor for adult prosecution if the seriousness of the alleged offense alone warrants it for community welfare, and in such transfer hearings, strict evidentiary rules are relaxed, allowing consideration of written psychological reports without requiring the author's live testimony. Furthermore, a trial court's decision to exclude evidence will be affirmed on appeal if any valid legal basis supports it, precluding presentation to a jury of a witness's invocation of their Fifth Amendment rights.
Facts:
- On November 12, 2002, Dominic McKaine, then sixteen years old, and three other individuals used force to unlawfully enter the residence of Charles and Amy in Cuero, Texas.
- McKaine entered the home carrying a twenty-gauge shotgun, while his companions were armed with handguns.
- The group forced Charles onto the kitchen floor, threatening to kill him if he resisted.
- McKaine pointed his shotgun at Amy, ordered her to remove her shirt, which she did, exposing her breasts in front of her husband and three small children.
- McKaine then took Amy and two of her children into a second bedroom, where he fondled her breasts, repeatedly stated he wanted to have sex, and threatened to kill her, her husband, and children if she told anyone.
- McKaine later took Amy into the living room and, in front of all three children, ordered her to pull down her pants; after she refused twice, he put his shotgun against her three-year-old son's head, threatening to kill him if she did not comply.
- Amy complied, but McKaine did not have sex with her; he and his companions subsequently left, taking a knife, cigarettes, and money belonging to the family, and repeating their threats before departing.
Procedural Posture:
- Dominic McKaine, at sixteen years old, was originally charged as a juvenile.
- The State petitioned the juvenile court to transfer McKaine's case to district court for prosecution as an adult.
- After a hearing, the juvenile court certified McKaine as an adult and transferred the case.
- Before the district court, McKaine pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation and committing aggravated assault therein.
- McKaine requested that a jury determine his punishment, and the jury sentenced him to seventy-five years' imprisonment.
- McKaine appealed his conviction and sentence to the Texas Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi, in its original opinion, reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new punishment hearing.
- The State filed a motion for rehearing with the Texas Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi.
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Issue:
1. Did the juvenile court abuse its discretion by transferring Dominic McKaine's case to district court, specifically by considering an uncross-examined psychological report and finding sufficient evidence for transfer? 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the victims' alleged drug activities during the punishment phase of the trial, which would have involved the witnesses invoking their Fifth Amendment rights before the jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice GARZA
No, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring Dominic McKaine's case to district court, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the victims' alleged drug activities during the punishment phase. Regarding the transfer, strict rules of evidence are not applied in juvenile transfer proceedings, and written reports from professional consultants are authorized evidence under Texas Family Code Section 54.02(e), thus the psychological report was admissible even without the author's live testimony. The Family Code does not specifically require live testimony from a professional consultant. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient for transfer because the juvenile court considered all required statutory factors and found that the seriousness of the offense alone warranted criminal proceedings for the welfare of the community, which is a sufficient basis for transfer even if other factors related to the child's background were challenged. As for the excluded evidence, a trial court's evidentiary ruling will be upheld if there is any valid legal basis for its decision, even if the stated reason was incorrect. Defense counsel's attempt to elicit testimony that would involve witnesses invoking their Fifth Amendment rights in front of the jury is impermissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 513(d), as a witness's assertion of this right is not evidence and the jury is not allowed to draw any inferences from such actions. Therefore, the evidence was properly excluded on this alternative legal basis.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the broad discretionary power of Texas juvenile courts in determining whether to waive jurisdiction and transfer a minor for adult prosecution, particularly emphasizing that the gravity of the offense itself can be a standalone justification for transfer. It clarifies that in such transfer hearings, the relaxed evidentiary standards permit the use of written professional reports as admissible hearsay, without mandating the author's live testimony. Furthermore, the opinion strengthens the principle that appellate courts will uphold a trial court's evidentiary rulings if any legal theory supports the exclusion, even if not the one articulated by the trial judge, and prohibits the strategic use of a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment before a jury. This has considerable implications for juvenile defense strategies, requiring careful consideration of the Family Code's specific provisions for transfer hearings, and for trial advocacy in general regarding the presentation of potentially incriminating witness testimony.
