McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995)
Rule of Law:
A state statute that broadly prohibits the distribution of all anonymous campaign literature abridges the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, as the right to publish anonymously is an aspect of core political speech.
Facts:
- Margaret McIntyre was opposed to a proposed school tax levy in Westerville, Ohio.
- On April 27, 1988, McIntyre distributed leaflets she had created to attendees of a public school meeting where the levy was to be discussed.
- The leaflets expressed opposition to the tax levy, and while some identified her as the author, others were signed only as from "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS."
- A school district official, who supported the tax levy, informed McIntyre that the unsigned leaflets violated Ohio's election laws.
- Undeterred, McIntyre distributed more of the handbills at another meeting the following evening.
- Five months after the levy was eventually passed, the school official filed a formal complaint against McIntyre with the Ohio Elections Commission.
Procedural Posture:
- A school official filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, which found Margaret McIntyre in violation of state law and fined her $100.
- McIntyre appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, a state trial court, which reversed the commission's order, finding the statute unconstitutional as applied to her.
- The Ohio Elections Commission, as appellant, appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, which reinstated the fine.
- McIntyre, as appellant, then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, the state's highest court, which affirmed the appellate court's decision and upheld the fine.
- The executor of McIntyre's estate, as petitioner, successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does an Ohio statute that prohibits the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violate the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes, the Ohio statute violates the freedom of speech. The freedom to publish anonymously is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment and is part of a respected tradition of advocacy and dissent in the United States. The Ohio law is a direct, content-based regulation of core political speech and is therefore subject to exacting scrutiny. Under this standard, the law must be narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. Ohio's asserted interests in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements and in informing the electorate are not sufficient to justify this broad prohibition. The state already has specific statutes that directly prohibit fraudulent statements in campaigns, and the informational value of an author's name and address on a leaflet from a private citizen is minimal. The statute's indiscriminate ban is a blunderbuss approach that unconstitutionally chills protected speech.
Concurring - Justice Ginsburg
Yes. This decision is a sound and straightforward application of First Amendment principles. The Court correctly finds the state's fine on an individual leafleteer speaking within her local community to be unconstitutional. However, the holding is appropriately narrow and does not foreclose the possibility that a more limited identification requirement could be justified in other, larger circumstances not presented by this case.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes. The Court reaches the correct result, but its reasoning should be based on the original understanding of the First Amendment, not on a modern assessment of the 'value' of anonymous speech. Historical evidence from the Founding era, including the widespread use of pseudonyms by the Framers in works like the Federalist Papers and the debates surrounding the practice, demonstrates that the phrase 'freedom of the press' was originally understood to protect an author's right to publish political views anonymously. The Ohio law is therefore inconsistent with the First Amendment as it was originally understood.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No, the Ohio statute does not violate the freedom of speech. The majority's decision strikes down a long-standing and widespread American legislative practice, as nearly every state has a similar law designed to protect the integrity of the election process. The historical evidence does not establish a constitutional right to anonymity specifically in the context of electioneering. These laws serve the compelling state interest of preventing fraud, libel, and campaign 'dirty tricks,' and they promote a more civil and accountable political debate. The Court should defer to the practical judgment of the elected legislatures that such a minor requirement is a reasonable and effective means of protecting elections.
Analysis:
This decision firmly establishes that anonymous political speech is a constitutionally protected right at the core of the First Amendment. By applying 'exacting scrutiny,' the Court set a high bar for any government attempt to compel the identification of speakers engaged in political advocacy. The ruling distinguishes between the broad prohibition of anonymous leafleting by individuals, which it strikes down, and the campaign finance disclosure requirements for candidates and large expenditures upheld in cases like Buckley v. Valeo. This precedent significantly limits the state's power to regulate political speech, forcing it to use more narrowly tailored means, such as laws directly punishing fraud, rather than broadly restricting anonymity.
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