McGrath v. Dockendorf
2016 Va. LEXIS 187, 292 Va. 834, 793 S.E.2d 336 (2016)
Rule of Law:
Virginia's "heart balm" statute, which abolishes civil actions for breach of promise to marry, does not bar a separate action in detinue to recover an engagement ring as a conditional gift.
Facts:
- Ethan Dockendorf proposed to Julia McGrath on August 25, 2012.
- McGrath accepted the proposal.
- Dockendorf gave McGrath a two-carat engagement ring valued at approximately $26,000.
- In September 2013, the relationship deteriorated.
- Dockendorf broke off the engagement.
- The parties never married.
- McGrath retained possession of the engagement ring after the breakup.
Procedural Posture:
- Dockendorf filed a complaint in detinue in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County seeking return of the ring.
- McGrath filed a demurrer (motion to dismiss), arguing the action was barred by the heart balm statute (Code § 8.01-220).
- The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer and held the statute did not bar the action.
- The Circuit Court ordered McGrath to return the ring within 30 days or pay judgment of $26,000.
- McGrath appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
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Issue:
Does Code § 8.01-220, known as the "heart balm" statute, prohibit a plaintiff from filing an action in detinue to recover an engagement ring following a broken engagement?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stephen R. McCullough
No. The heart balm statute does not bar a detinue action for the recovery of conditional gifts given in contemplation of marriage. The Court reasoned that the primary objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the legislative intent expressed in the text. Code § 8.01-220(A) expressly abolishes three specific torts: alienation of affection, breach of promise to marry, and criminal conversation. It does not mention the law of conditional gifts or the action of detinue. The Court distinguished the abolished "breach of promise to marry" action, which sought broad damages for humiliation and loss of social position, from an action in detinue, which strictly seeks the recovery of specific personal property or its value. Citing Pretlow v. Pretlow, the Court noted that Virginia has long recognized that engagement rings are conditional gifts that must be returned if the condition (marriage) is not met. The Court presumed the legislature was aware of this common law principle when it enacted the heart balm statute and chose not to include it in the prohibition. Finally, the Court distinguished this case from McDermott v. Reynolds, noting that Dockendorf was not attempting to disguise a banned claim as a different tort, but was pursuing a distinct and valid legal theory based on property rights.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundaries of "heart balm" statutes, which were designed to prevent blackmail and excessive verdicts associated with emotional distress over broken romances. The court reinforces the property-law concept of the "conditional gift," treating the engagement ring as a specific chattel subject to return upon the failure of the condition (marriage), regardless of the emotional context. This ruling aligns Virginia with the majority of jurisdictions, ensuring that while one cannot sue for a "broken heart," one can still utilize the courts to recover valuable property exchanged in anticipation of a contract (marriage) that was never executed.
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