McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.
196 A. 2d 238, 41 N.J. 272, 1963 N.J. LEXIS 153 (1963)
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Rule of Law:
The legal doctrine of assumption of the risk, in both its primary and secondary senses, is abolished as a separate defense in New Jersey and its concepts are to be analyzed solely under the principles of a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's contributory negligence.
Facts:
- Glenwal Co., Inc. was engaged in a construction project.
- As part of its work, Glenwal erected a temporary 'catwalk' over a deep channel or trench.
- The catwalk was constructed with four-by-fours laid across the cut, topped with planks running at right angles to the four-by-fours.
- A worker, employed by an unrelated contractor on the job, was killed when one of the planks up-ended, causing him to fall through the catwalk.
Procedural Posture:
- The representative of the deceased worker obtained a jury verdict against Glenwal Co., Inc. in the trial court (court of first instance).
- Glenwal Co., Inc. appealed the jury verdict to the Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the verdict, with one judge dissenting.
- Glenwal Co., Inc. appealed further to the Supreme Court of New Jersey (highest court) as of right.
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Issue:
Should the legal doctrine of 'assumption of the risk' continue to be applied as a distinct defense in New Jersey, or should its concepts be fully integrated into the analyses of negligence and contributory negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, the legal doctrine of 'assumption of the risk' should no longer be used as a distinct defense in New Jersey and is to be banished from the legal landscape, with its components absorbed into negligence and contributory negligence analyses. The court reaffirms its prior holding in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., that "assumption of the risk" was used in two confusing senses: either meaning the defendant was not negligent, or the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The court reiterated that there are only two true issues: a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's contributory negligence, both to be judged by the standard of the reasonably prudent person. The court observed that despite Meistrich, the terminology of assumption of risk continued to mislead, and that a plaintiff's mere appreciation of a danger does not automatically bar recovery. If a danger resulted from the defendant's breach of duty, that negligence persists even if the plaintiff knew of it; the plaintiff's knowledge would then lead to an inquiry into contributory negligence, assessing whether the plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person in view of the known risk. The court explicitly states that one who must work to live is not necessarily negligent for continuing work after learning of a hazard. Concluding that the term "assumption of risk" is "so apt to create mist that it is better banished from the scene," the court mandates that future cases should adhere solely to the terms "negligence" and "contributory negligence."
Analysis:
This case solidifies the New Jersey Supreme Court's commitment to simplifying tort law by eliminating confusing and redundant legal terminology. By explicitly abolishing the phrase 'assumption of the risk,' the court ensures that juries focus on the core issues of defendant's fault and plaintiff's proportionate fault. This decision prevents misdirection in jury instructions, particularly by clarifying that a plaintiff's knowledge of a risk does not automatically negate a defendant's negligence or bar recovery, instead channeling such considerations into the contributory negligence framework. It has a significant impact on future cases by streamlining legal analysis in personal injury claims, ensuring greater consistency and clarity in the application of negligence principles.
