McGRATH III v. City of Miami
789 So.2d 1168, 2001 WL 769995 (2001)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A statute that authorizes a municipality to impose a non-ad valorem tax is unconstitutional if it constitutes a special law, meaning it defines an eligibility class using a fixed past date, thereby creating a closed class of entities that cannot expand over time.
Facts:
- In 1999, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 218.503(5), Florida Statutes, which allowed certain municipalities to impose a discretionary per vehicle surcharge of up to 20 percent on parking facility revenues.
- The statute applied to municipalities with a resident population of 300,000 or more on April 1, 1999, and which had been declared in a state of financial emergency within the previous two fiscal years.
- The City of Miami (City) passed and adopted Ordinance No. 11813 in July 1999 to implement the parking tax authorized by the statute.
- Patrick McGrath III, Miami-Dade County, and Laureen Varga (appellants/taxpayers) challenged the constitutionality of the statute.
- The Florida Constitution, specifically Article VII, §§ 1(a) and 9(a), permits municipalities to impose non-ad valorem taxes only as authorized by general law.
Procedural Posture:
- Patrick McGrath III, Miami-Dade County, and Laureen Varga challenged the constitutionality of Section 218.503(5), Florida Statutes, and Ordinance No. 11813 adopted by the City of Miami.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Miami, finding the ordinance validly enacted and upholding the constitutionality of the parking tax statute.
- Patrick McGrath III and intervenors/appellants Miami-Dade County and Laureen Varga appealed the final declaratory judgment to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a Florida statute that authorizes a discretionary parking tax for municipalities meeting specific population and financial emergency criteria based on an unchangeable past date constitute an unconstitutional special law?
Opinions:
Majority - PER CURIAM
Yes, the Florida statute authorizing a discretionary parking tax is an unconstitutional special law because it defines a closed class of municipalities. The court held that the statute, by "anchoring the 300,000 population classification to the specific date of April 1, 1999," fails to operate uniformly among all cities that may eventually meet the population threshold. This fixed past date "forever exclude[s]" cities that reach the population criteria after April 1, 1999, thus preventing the class of eligible entities from expanding. Such a definition is akin to specifically naming the cities to which the law applies, which is characteristic of a special law. Because the Florida Constitution mandates that municipalities can only impose non-ad valorem taxes if authorized by a general law, and this statute is a special law, it is unconstitutional. Consequently, the City of Miami's ordinance based on this invalid statute is also void.
Analysis:
This case clarifies and reiterates the constitutional distinction between general laws and special laws in Florida, particularly concerning municipal taxing authority. It establishes that legislative classifications that rely on fixed past dates to define eligibility create a closed class, which violates the requirement for a general law to operate uniformly and allow for future inclusions. The ruling serves as a critical guide for legislative drafting, ensuring that statutory schemes granting taxing power to local governments do not inadvertently create unconstitutional special laws. This reinforces the principle of equal application of law across governmental entities and restricts legislative ability to target specific municipalities through narrowly defined historical criteria.
