McGee v. United States
1971 U.S. LEXIS 45, 91 S. Ct. 1565, 402 U.S. 479 (1971)
Rule of Law:
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine generally bars judicial review of Selective Service classification claims when a registrant deliberately bypasses administrative processes designed for fact-finding and the application of agency expertise, especially for claims requiring such factual resolution.
Facts:
- In February 1966, while attending the University of Rochester, McGee applied to his local Selective Service board for conscientious objector (CO) status.
- The board continued McGee's student deferment and advised him that the CO claim would be passed upon when his student status no longer applied.
- In April 1967, McGee wrote to President Johnson, enclosing charred remnants of his draft cards and declaring his conviction against violence and war, mentioning potential qualification for a theological deferment through graduate study.
- McGee graduated in June 1967 and subsequently returned a current information questionnaire unanswered, announcing a policy of noncooperation with the Selective Service System.
- In September 1967, the board reviewed McGee's file, rejected his pending CO claim, and reclassified him I-A (available for military service).
- McGee neither sought a personal appearance before the local board nor review by the appeal board, and returned the reclassification notice unopened.
- McGee did not appear for a physical examination ordered for October 1967.
- In January 1968, McGee responded to an order to appear for induction and took a physical examination but refused to submit to induction.
Procedural Posture:
- The Government prosecuted McGee under the Military Selective Service Act for failing to submit to induction (count I), failing to report for a pre-induction physical examination (count II), failing to keep possession of a valid classification notice (count III), and failing to submit requested information relevant to his draft status (count IV).
- McGee was convicted on all four counts in the District Court and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.
- McGee appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the conviction, holding that McGee’s principal defense of incorrect classification was barred because he had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available for correction of such an error.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the applicability of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine in the circumstances of this case.
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Issue:
Does the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine bar a criminal defendant from asserting the defense of incorrect Selective Service classification when the defendant deliberately failed to pursue administrative appeals for fact-intensive claims like conscientious objector or ministerial student status?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes, the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does bar a criminal defendant from asserting the defense of incorrect Selective Service classification when the defendant deliberately failed to pursue administrative appeals for fact-intensive claims like conscientious objector or ministerial student status. The Court affirmed McGee's conviction, holding that his failure to exhaust administrative remedies barred his defense of erroneous classification. Unlike the claim in McKart v. United States, which involved a question "solely of statutory interpretation" where all relevant facts were presented, McGee's claims for conscientious objector status or ministerial student exemption depended on the resolution of particularistic factual questions and the application of administrative expertise. McGee's deliberate failure to seek a personal appearance before the local board or an appeal to the appeal board deprived the Selective Service System of critical opportunities to gather facts, exercise its discretion, and apply its expertise regarding his beliefs and sincerity. This bypass jeopardized the functional autonomy of the administrative bodies primarily responsible for classification and risked encouraging deliberate flouting of administrative processes, thus constituting a "governmental interest compelling enough" to justify foreclosing judicial review.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Douglas
No, the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine should not bar McGee's defense because the Selective Service Board failed to properly "consider" and reject his conscientious objector claim in the first instance. Justice Douglas argued that the board's own records and testimony indicated that it had merely deferred consideration of the CO claim in 1966, stating it would be addressed later, and then in 1967, it wrongly assumed a prior denial to justify the I-A classification. Since the board did not actually "consider" the claim on its merits, McGee had no meaningful opportunity to appeal a definitive denial. Given that all lower courts agreed there was no factual basis to question McGee's sincerity or his CO status, and that his claim was plausible as a theological student preparing for the ministry, penalizing him for the board's dereliction of duty would be a miscarriage of justice. This situation, where the board itself defaulted on its duty to consider information, is even stronger than McKart for excusing exhaustion, as it involves a failure of the administrative process itself, not merely a question of law.
Analysis:
This case refines the application of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine established in McKart v. United States, distinguishing between claims requiring factual development and agency expertise versus purely legal questions. McGee emphasizes that when a registrant's classification claim is highly fact-dependent (e.g., sincerity of conscientious objection, details of ministerial study), and the registrant actively and deliberately avoids administrative processes designed to gather and evaluate those facts, the interest in administrative autonomy and efficient functioning outweighs the harshness of denying judicial review. This decision reinforces the importance of using prescribed administrative channels for factual disputes, placing a significant burden on registrants to cooperate with the system before seeking judicial intervention, particularly in criminal contexts.
