McFarland v. Scott
512 U.S. 849 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
An indigent capital defendant establishes a right to appointed counsel and invokes a federal court's jurisdiction to issue a stay of execution by filing a motion requesting the appointment of counsel for a federal habeas corpus proceeding, even before a formal habeas petition is filed.
Facts:
- Frank Basil McFarland was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death on November 13, 1989.
- After his state appeals failed, a Texas trial court scheduled his execution for September 23, 1993, which was later modified to October 27, 1993.
- The Texas Resource Center, a legal services organization, informed the state court that it had been unable to recruit volunteer counsel to represent McFarland in his state habeas corpus proceeding.
- The state courts refused McFarland's requests to appoint counsel for his state habeas proceeding or to grant a stay of his execution.
- Facing an imminent execution date without legal representation, McFarland sought assistance from the federal courts.
Procedural Posture:
- McFarland filed a pro se motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, requesting appointment of counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) and a stay of execution.
- The District Court, a trial court, denied the motion, concluding it lacked jurisdiction because no formal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 had been filed.
- The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the District Court's denial of a stay, holding that a motion for counsel is not the equivalent of a pending habeas proceeding.
- The United States Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and subsequently granted McFarland's petition for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does an indigent capital defendant's motion for appointment of counsel under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) initiate a federal habeas corpus proceeding, thereby giving a district court jurisdiction to appoint counsel and issue a stay of execution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
Yes. A capital defendant's motion requesting the appointment of counsel for a federal habeas corpus proceeding is sufficient to commence a 'post conviction proceeding' under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), which in turn gives a federal court jurisdiction to enter a stay of execution under 28 U.S.C. § 2251. The statutory right to counsel would be meaningless if an indigent, uncounseled defendant were required to file a legally sufficient habeas petition to obtain counsel, as doing so would risk having the pro se petition summarily dismissed and any subsequent petition barred as an abuse of the writ. The statute's provision for expert and investigative services, which are often necessary before a petition can be filed, further implies that the right to counsel attaches pre-filing. The stay provision in § 2251 and the right-to-counsel provision in § 848(q)(4)(B) must be read 'in pari materia' to give effect to Congress's intent to provide meaningful legal representation in capital cases.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice O’Connor
Partially Yes, Partially No. While a motion for counsel is sufficient to trigger the statutory right to have counsel appointed under § 848(q)(4)(B), it is not sufficient to give a district court jurisdiction to enter a stay of execution under § 2251. The right to counsel is 'almost meaningless' if it does not include pre-filing assistance to prepare the petition. However, the habeas statute, § 2251, authorizes a stay only when a 'habeas corpus proceeding is pending,' which, based on the text and structure of the habeas statutes and rules, occurs only after a formal application or petition is filed. Granting a stay without any filed claim conflicts with the principle that habeas review is reserved for colorable constitutional errors, not merely to enforce a statutory right to counsel. This inconsistency is a legislative problem for Congress to resolve.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. A district court lacks jurisdiction to either appoint counsel or grant a stay until a formal application for a writ of habeas corpus has been filed. The plain language of § 848(q)(4)(B) makes counsel available only '[i]n any post conviction proceeding,' and established habeas law dictates that such a proceeding is commenced only by the filing of a petition. The majority improperly uses the later-enacted § 848(q) to redefine the meaning of 'proceeding' in the long-standing habeas statute, § 2251, which is a backward approach to statutory interpretation. Congress provided for the funding of counsel within an existing proceeding, not a new mechanism to initiate one. Alternative sources of legal assistance exist to help prisoners prepare their petitions, and the Court's decision wrongly expands federal power to interfere with state criminal judgments.
Analysis:
This decision significantly altered the procedural landscape for capital habeas corpus litigation by establishing that the statutory right to counsel can be invoked prior to the filing of a formal petition. It created a critical 'placeholder' mechanism, allowing death row inmates to secure counsel and a stay of execution, thereby ensuring that the statutory right to counsel is meaningful and not a hollow promise. The ruling prioritizes the practical reality of complex capital litigation over a rigid, formalistic reading of when a 'proceeding' commences, preventing executions from occurring before a defendant's claims can be properly investigated and presented by a qualified attorney.
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