McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified School District
212 Cal.App.2d 422, 1963 Cal. App. LEXIS 2862, 28 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A conveyance of land for a specific purpose which states that the premises 'shall revert' to the grantor 'whenever' the grantee abandons the premises or fails to use them for that purpose creates a fee simple determinable, causing the estate to automatically terminate and revert to the grantor's successors upon the occurrence of the specified event.
Facts:
- On August 31, 1867, William Paul conveyed a parcel of land to the trustees of the Mayfield School District.
- The deed specified the land was 'to be used as a public school for said District forever.'
- The deed contained a clause stating that 'whenever' the school district 'shall abandon the premises hereby conveyed for school purposes or shall fail neglect or refuse to use said premises for common school uses and purposes then and in that event the said premises shall revert to the said party of the first part.'
- The school district erected a school on the land and operated it for many years.
- In 1940, the school building was demolished.
- From 1940 until 1959, the school district did not use the property for any school-related purpose, although it maintained plans to potentially build another school there.
- Appellants are successors in interest to William Paul, claiming a one-fourth interest in the property.
- Respondent Palo Alto Unified School District is the successor in interest to the original Mayfield School District trustees.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1948, Katherine McDougall, an heir of William Paul, successfully sued the school district in a state trial court to quiet title to her undivided three-fourths interest in the property; that judgment became final.
- In 1959, the County of Santa Clara initiated eminent domain proceedings in state trial court to condemn the property.
- In the condemnation action, the trial court held a preliminary trial to determine who owned the remaining one-fourth interest: the other heirs of William Paul (appellants) or the school district (respondent).
- The trial court found in favor of the school district, concluding it owned the one-fourth interest and was entitled to a corresponding portion of the condemnation award.
- The heirs of William Paul (appellants) appealed that portion of the judgment to this intermediate court of appeal, with the school district as the respondent.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a deed that grants land for school purposes and states that the premises 'shall revert' to the grantor 'whenever' the grantee abandons or fails to use the premises for such purposes create a fee simple determinable that automatically terminates the grantee's estate upon non-use?
Opinions:
Majority - Sullivan, J.
Yes, such language creates a fee simple determinable that automatically terminates the grantee's estate upon non-use. The court reasoned that the language of the deed, particularly the words 'whenever' and 'shall revert,' manifested the grantor's intent that the estate should automatically expire upon the occurrence of the stated event—the cessation of use for school purposes. This creates a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter, not a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent which would require the grantor's successors to exercise a right of re-entry. Because the termination was automatic, no act of forfeiture was required by the appellants, and title reverted to them when the school district failed to use the property for school purposes for nearly 20 years.
Analysis:
This decision provides a clear example of the specific phrasing required to create a fee simple determinable in California real property law. It establishes that technical words like 'so long as' are not essential; rather, the grantor's intent for an automatic termination of the estate is the controlling factor. The case distinguishes this from a fee simple on condition subsequent, clarifying that the latter requires words of condition and an affirmative act of re-entry, whereas a determinable fee expires by its own limitation. The opinion also notably limits the offensive use of collateral estoppel under the Bernhard doctrine, preventing a new plaintiff from using a prior judgment against a defendant who was a party to that earlier case.
