Yes. The person suing has to start by showing things that make the situation look like it might be discrimination, which then makes the company explain itself with a good, non-discriminatory reason. The Court created a three-step process for these cases. Step 1: The person suing (Green) must show it's possible there was discrimination (he's black, he was qualified for the job, he was rejected, and the company kept looking for others). Step 2: The company (McDonnell Douglas) must give a legitimate business reason for not hiring him. Saying they didn't want to hire someone who had committed illegal acts against them was a good enough reason. Step 3: Green gets another turn to prove the company's reason was just a cover-up (a 'pretext') and the real reason was his race. For example, he could win if he showed that the company hired white protesters who had done similar things.

Yes, the law could prohibit the company's refusal to rehire Green, but it depends on the specific facts. The Court said Green made an initial case of racial discrimination by showing that he's black, he applied and was qualified for the job, he was rejected, and the company kept looking for other applicants. The company then gave a non-discriminatory reason - Green's illegal protest activity. But the Court said Green should have a chance to prove that this reason was just an excuse and that race was the real reason. He could try to show this by pointing to evidence like how the company treated him before, how it reacted to his legal civil rights activities, its history of hiring minorities, and whether it treated white employees who did similar illegal things the same way. The law doesn't force the company to rehire someone who broke the law against it, but it also doesn't let the company use that as an excuse for racial discrimination.

Yes, the law could prohibit the company's refusal to rehire Green, but it depends on the specific facts. We said Green made an initial case of racial discrimination by showing that he's black, he applied and was qualified for the job, he was rejected, and the company kept looking for other applicants. The company then gave a non-discriminatory reason—Green's illegal protest activity. But we also said Green should have a chance to prove that this reason was just an excuse and that race was the real reason. He could try to show this by pointing to evidence like how the company treated him before, how it reacted to his legal civil rights activities, its history of hiring minorities, and whether it treated white employees who did similar illegal things the same way. The law doesn't force the company to rehire someone who broke the law against it, but it also doesn't let the company use that as an excuse for racial discrimination.

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then "the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Id

A plaintiff in a Title VII case has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."... Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the …

In general, to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a plaintiff must show that:(1) she is a member of a protected class;(2) she was qualified for the position in question;(3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and;(4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

Thereafter, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered reason was really a pretext for discrimination.

Plaintiff must show:(i) that he belongs to racial minority;(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which his employer was seeking applicants;(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.

An ADEA plaintiff may establish a presumption of discrimination by making out a prima facie case of age discrimination

For cases of discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, the court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, such claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Yes. A complainant in a Title VII action carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which then shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision. The Court established a three-part burden-shifting framework. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing: (i) they belong to a racial minority; (ii) they applied and were qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) they were rejected despite their qualifications; and (iv) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants. Second, if the prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the rejection. Here, McDonnell Douglas's reason—Green's participation in illegal and disruptive protests against the company—is a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification. Third, the plaintiff must then be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason was in fact a pretext for discrimination. Evidence of pretext can include showing that the employer retained or rehired white employees who engaged in acts of comparable seriousness.

Yes. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. The Court held that Green had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. The burden then shifted to McDonnell Douglas to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, which it did by citing Green's participation in the illegal 'stall-in.' However, on remand, Green must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas' stated reason was just a pretext for a racially discriminatory decision. Evidence relevant to showing pretext could include McDonnell Douglas' treatment of Green during his prior employment, the company's reaction to Green's legitimate civil rights activities, the company's general policy and practice with respect to minority employment, and whether white employees involved in similar illegal demonstrations were treated more favorably. The Court emphasized that Title VII does not compel an employer to rehire an employee who has engaged in deliberate, unlawful activity against it, but it also does not permit the employer to use such activity as a pretext for racial discrimination.

Title VII does not necessarily prohibit an employer from refusing to rehire an individual based solely on participation in an unlawful civil rights protest, but we remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the stated reason was pretextual. We vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. We held that Green had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with his qualifications. The burden then shifted to McDonnell Douglas to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, which it did by citing Green's participation in the illegal 'stall-in.' However, on remand, Green must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas' stated reason was merely a pretext for a racially discriminatory decision. Evidence relevant to showing pretext could include McDonnell Douglas' treatment of Green during his prior employment, the company's reaction to Green's legitimate civil rights activities, the company's general policy and practice with respect to minority employment, and whether white employees involved in similar illegal demonstrations were treated more favorably. We emphasize that Title VII does not compel an employer to rehire an employee who has engaged in deliberate, unlawful activity against it, but it also does not permit the employer to use such activity as a pretext for racial discrimination.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

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