Yes. The 'not a contract' warning was basically hidden. Because it wasn't obvious, the promises Mobil made in the handbook about a fair discipline process could have changed the original 'fire you anytime' deal. What matters isn't what Mobil secretly intended, but what a reasonable employee would think based on the handbook Mobil gave them. This is confusing enough that it can't be decided quickly and must go back to a lower court for a full hearing.

No. McDonald signed a paper that clearly said he could be fired at any time. Getting a handbook later doesn't change that clear, upfront agreement. This ruling basically kills the idea of 'at-will' employment, because now any handbook or conversation could be used to challenge a firing.

No. We already decided in the first hearing that there was no contract. A contract requires a 'meeting of the minds,' and Mobil's disclaimer—even if it was small—shows they never intended to make a contract. The court is confusing two different legal ideas and getting it wrong.

Yes, but for a different reason. I agree that McDonald has a case, but it's not about whether the handbook is a contract. It's about 'promissory estoppel,' which means if a company makes a promise and an employee relies on it, it's unfair for the company to break that promise. That's the issue that should be decided.

Yes, the guidebook and how the boss acted do lead to a real question about the job being one where you can only be fired for a good reason. This is because the guidebook had promises that seemed serious and the worker had good reason to believe them. The warnings in the guidebook and job application that said 'this isn't a contract' weren't clear enough to count. The court uses the objective theory of contract formation, which means it looks at what the boss did and said, not just what they were thinking, to decide if there was a real promise.

No, the guidebook and the boss's actions didn't change the job from 'can be fired anytime' to 'can only be fired for a good reason' because the company was very clear from the start that it was an 'anytime firing' job. The guidebook didn't change that, and the court's decision doesn't make sense because it ignores the real deal between McDonald and Mobil. This pretty much gets rid of 'anytime firing' jobs in Wyoming.

No, the guidebook didn't make a real contract because the company never planned to make one, both sides didn't agree on it, and there wasn't a real trade-off. The court's earlier decision to flip the case based on the idea that the worker relied on promises is different from saying now that those promises made a contract.

I agree with the main decision that there's a real question about whether the boss meant to make serious promises about firing workers. The boss's actions showed they meant to make these promises, and now the only thing to figure out is whether the boss should be stopped from firing the worker without a good reason.

SIGNING I agree that any offer of employment, and acceptance thereof, does not constitute a binding contract of any length, and that such employment is terminable at the will of either party, subject to appropriate state and/or federal laws.

In determining whether an implied contract was formed, we look not to the subjective intent of the parties, but to " `the outward manifestations of a party's assent sufficient to create reasonable reliance by the other party.'"

—striking down a handbook disclaimer, emphasizing it "was not set off by a border or larger print, was not capitalized, and was contained in a general welcoming section of the handbook

The court further stated that “the disclaimer was unclear as to its effect on the employment relationship

—explaining that defendant's "subjective'intent'to contract is irrelevant, if [defendant's] intentional, objective manifestations to [plaintiff] indicated assent to a contractual relationship

As a result, under the objective theory of contract formation, the meaning and effect of the implied in fact contract of employment that may have been formed between the employer and the employee created a genuine issue of material fact which precluded summary judgment.

The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that in determining whether an employer intended to modify at-will employment with its employment handbook, one must evaluate whether the employer's objective manifestations of assent to contract created reasonable reliance by the employee.

The plurality in McDonald I recognized that its earlier decision in McDonald I was too subjective, and subsequently decided that the objective theory of assent was the proper theory to apply in that case.

A contract can be formed where one party lacks subjective intent, but nevertheless proceeds as if there were a contract.

—the California Supreme Court elaborated on a more expansive view of whether the parties' conduct can alter the employee's status of employment at will: "Where there is no express agreement, the issue is whether other evidence of the parties' conduct has a'tendency in reason'(Evid. Code, § 210) to demonstrate the existence of an actual mutual understanding on …

Yes. An employee handbook containing specific disciplinary procedures and an inconspicuous disclaimer creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an at-will employment relationship was modified into one terminable only for cause. For a disclaimer to be effective, it must be conspicuous, a determination which is a matter of law for the court. Here, Mobil's disclaimer was not conspicuous because it was not set off, capitalized, or otherwise highlighted, and it was placed within a general welcoming section. The court adopts the objective theory of contract formation, under which an employer's subjective intent not to form a contract is irrelevant if their outward manifestations, such as the promises in the handbook, create a reasonable reliance by the employee. The combination of Mobil's promises of fair treatment and progressive discipline with the inconspicuous and ambiguous disclaimer creates a mixed question of law and fact regarding whether the at-will relationship was modified, thus making summary judgment improper.

No. The at-will employment relationship was not modified, and no genuine issue of material fact exists. McDonald signed a separate, clear document explicitly stating that his employment was at-will. The subsequent delivery of a general employee handbook could not alter this clear, pre-existing contractual arrangement. The majority's emphasis on a conspicuous disclaimer within the handbook is misplaced when a separate at-will agreement already exists. This decision effectively eliminates at-will employment in Wyoming, as any subsequent dialogue or document from an employer could now be construed as a modification creating a jury question.

No. The trial court's summary judgment should be affirmed because no contract was formed. The majority opinion contradicts the court's prior decision in McDonald I, which was based on promissory estoppel after finding no contract existed. For a contract to be formed, there must be a meeting of the minds, intent to contract, and consideration, all of which are absent here. Mobil's express disclaimer, however inconspicuous, demonstrates it never intended to form a contract. The court is now improperly conflating the requirements for promissory estoppel (a promise justifiably relied upon) with the formation of a contract.

Yes. While a genuine issue of material fact exists, the proper legal framework is promissory estoppel, as established in McDonald I, not contract modification. Mobil's handbook and course of conduct demonstrated an intent to make legally binding promises regarding termination procedures, which McDonald reasonably relied upon. The question for remand should not be whether a contract was formed, but whether Mobil's termination procedures must be enforced to avoid injustice under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Yes, an employee handbook, along with the employer's course of dealing, does create a material question of fact as to whether an at-will employment relationship was modified to one terminable only for cause. The handbook contained promises that Mobil intended to be legally binding and upon which McDonald reasonably relied. The disclaimers in the handbook and employment application were not sufficiently conspicuous to be binding on McDonald, and Mobil's course of conduct indicated an intent to make legally binding promises concerning employment termination procedures. The objective theory of contract formation, focusing on the outward manifestations of assent sufficient to create reasonable reliance by the other party, is the appropriate standard for determining the existence of a contract.

No, the employee handbook and Mobil's course of dealing did not modify the at-will employment relationship because Mobil made it clear that the employment was at-will and the handbook did not change this arrangement. The majority's reliance on other cases fails to recognize the actual employment-at-will arrangement between McDonald and Mobil. This decision effectively eliminates the possibility of at-will employment in Wyoming.

No, the employee handbook did not create an enforceable contract because Mobil never intended to make a contract, there was no meeting of the minds, and there was no valid consideration. The court's decision to reverse based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the previous opinion is inconsistent with the current opinion's stance that a contract was formed.

I concur with the majority that there is a material question of fact as to whether Mobil intended to make legally binding promises concerning employment termination procedures. Mobil's conduct demonstrated an intent to make such promises, and the only question for remand is whether Mobil should be estopped from firing McDonald without cause.

McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc.

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