McDonald v. Mabee
37 S. Ct. 343, 243 U.S. 90, 1917 U.S. LEXIS 2096 (1917)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Service of process by publication on a defendant who is domiciled in the state but has departed with the intent to establish a new domicile elsewhere does not satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the purpose of rendering a valid personal judgment.
Facts:
- A plaintiff held a promissory note from the defendant, Mabee.
- Mabee was domiciled in Texas but left the state with the intention of establishing a new home in a different state.
- While Mabee was absent from Texas, the plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against him in a Texas court based on the promissory note.
- The only service of process on Mabee was by publication in a Texas newspaper once a week for four consecutive weeks.
- Mabee did not appear in the Texas lawsuit.
- Mabee subsequently returned to Texas for a short period before ultimately establishing his permanent domicile in Missouri.
Procedural Posture:
- A plaintiff first sued Mabee in a Texas court on a promissory note and obtained a default personal judgment.
- Service in that first suit was made solely by publication in a newspaper after Mabee had left Texas.
- The plaintiff then initiated a second lawsuit on the same promissory note.
- As a defense, Mabee asserted that the note had merged into the prior judgment, barring a second suit.
- The plaintiff countered that the first judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction due to constitutionally inadequate service.
- The Supreme Court of Texas held that the service by publication was sufficient and the prior judgment was a valid personal judgment.
- The plaintiff, whose contention was overruled, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does service of process by publication in a newspaper on a defendant who is domiciled in a state, but has left that state with the intent to establish a home elsewhere, satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the purpose of rendering a personal judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Holmes
No. Service of process by publication on a defendant who has left their state of domicile intending not to return is insufficient to support a personal money judgment and violates the constitutional right to due process of law. The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, and while substituted service is sometimes permissible, it must be reasonably calculated to provide actual notice to the defendant. An advertisement in a local newspaper is not sufficient notice for a person who has departed the state with no intent to return. To satisfy the requirements of substantial justice under the Due Process Clause, the chosen method of substituted service must be the one most likely to reach the defendant. A personal judgment for money that is rendered without service that amounts to due process is void, both within the state that rendered it and outside of it.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the constitutional limits of personal jurisdiction over absent domiciliaries, extending the principles of Pennoyer v. Neff to situations beyond non-residents. It establishes that even for a domiciliary, the method of service must comport with 'fair play' and be reasonably likely to provide actual notice. The court's focus on the inadequacy of publication for someone who has left the state foreshadows the modern 'notice reasonably calculated' standard later articulated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. This case reinforces the principle that a judgment obtained without constitutionally adequate notice is void and unenforceable.
