McDaniel v. Paty
1978 U.S. LEXIS 81, 98 S. Ct. 1322, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute that disqualifies ordained ministers from holding legislative office violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, because it conditions the exercise of a civil right on the surrender of a religious profession without a compelling state interest.
Facts:
- In 1796, Tennessee's first Constitution included a provision disqualifying ministers from serving as legislators.
- This disqualifying provision, now Article 9, Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, has remained unchanged since its adoption.
- In 1976, the Tennessee legislature enacted a law applying this provision to candidates for delegate to the State’s 1977 limited constitutional convention.
- McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chattanooga, Tennessee, filed as a candidate for delegate to the constitutional convention.
- Selma Cash Paty, an opposing candidate, sued in Chancery Court seeking a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified and to strike his name from the ballot.
Procedural Posture:
- McDaniel, an ordained minister, filed as a candidate for delegate to Tennessee's 1977 constitutional convention.
- An opposing candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued McDaniel in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified and to strike his name from the ballot.
- The Chancery Court held that the disqualification statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and declared McDaniel eligible for the office of delegate.
- McDaniel's name remained on the ballot, and he was elected as a delegate in the ensuing election.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon 'religious belief' and was justified by the state's interest in preventing the establishment of religion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on appeal.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that bars ordained ministers from serving as delegates to a constitutional convention violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
Yes, a state statute that bars ordained ministers from serving as delegates to a constitutional convention violates McDaniel's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Court held that Tennessee's law effectively 'punishes a religious profession with the privation of a civil right' by making McDaniel choose between his right to seek office and his religiously impelled ministry. While distinguishing this case from Torcaso v. Watkins (which concerned religious belief), the Court found that the Tennessee disqualification, directed at McDaniel's status as a minister (defined by conduct and activity), nonetheless burdened his free exercise of religion. The state's asserted interest in preventing the establishment of religion was deemed insufficient because Tennessee failed to demonstrate that clergymen in public office would be less faithful to anti-establishment interests or their civil oaths than their unordained counterparts. The Court emphasized that only state interests of the 'highest order' that cannot otherwise be served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion, a standard Tennessee failed to meet given the historical context and the abandonment of similar provisions by almost all other states.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes, the Tennessee statute violates both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Justice Brennan argued that the state's distinction between 'religious belief' and the 'career or calling' of the ministry is unsound, as freedom of belief includes the freedom to profess and practice that belief, even as a livelihood. He asserted that the provision imposes a unique disability based on intense religious involvement, which he considered an absolutely prohibited religious classification or 'religious test for office,' as in Torcaso v. Watkins. Furthermore, he contended that conditioning eligibility for office on abandoning one's ministry is an unconstitutional penalty on religious faith, similar to Sherbert v. Verner. Brennan also found the exclusion violated the Establishment Clause, arguing it showed patent hostility toward religion, forced ministers to abandon their calling, and inhibited religion. He noted that historical provisions in state constitutions are not a guide to the Establishment Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Clause is a shield against government inhibition of religion, not a sword for its repression.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes, the Tennessee statute, which disqualifies ministers from serving as delegates to the state's constitutional convention, is unconstitutional. Justice Stewart agreed with Justice Brennan that Torcaso v. Watkins controls this case. He stated that the offense against the First and Fourteenth Amendments lay in 'limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept.' He found that the distinction between basing a disqualification on a person’s statement of belief and on their decision to pursue a religious vocation as directed by their belief is 'without constitutional consequence.' Like Torcaso, McDaniel was penalized for his religious status—for what he is and believes in—rather than for any particular act deemed harmful to society.
Concurring - Mr. Justice White
Yes, Tennessee’s disqualification of ministers from serving as delegates to the State’s constitutional convention is constitutionally impermissible. Justice White concurred in the judgment but would hold the statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Free Exercise Clause. He was not persuaded that the statute interfered with McDaniel’s ability to exercise his religion. He emphasized the fundamental importance of the right to seek elective office and stated that the state’s justification for this absolute disqualification was insufficient. He noted that all 49 other states are able to maintain the separation between church and state without burdening ministers’ rights to candidacy, suggesting Tennessee’s underlying assumption is unfounded. Additionally, he found the statute to be both underinclusive (applying only to legislative positions) and overinclusive (disqualifying all ministers regardless of their beliefs), thus violating equal protection.
Analysis:
This case is significant for solidifying the principle that states cannot broadly exclude individuals from public office based solely on their religious profession or status. It reinforces the application of the Free Exercise Clause against state actions that impose burdens on religious practice, even when framed as 'actions' rather than 'beliefs.' The diverse concurring opinions, particularly Justice White's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause, highlight alternative constitutional avenues for challenging discriminatory restrictions on political participation. The ruling prevents states from making speculative fears about religious influence a 'compelling' justification for sweeping bans on clergy in office, promoting broader political inclusion and reaffirming that citizens should not be forced to choose between civil rights and religious observance.
