McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission
572 U. S. ____ (2014) (2014)
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Rule of Law:
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's aggregate limits on the total amount an individual may contribute to all federal candidates, parties, and political action committees in an election cycle violate the First Amendment's protection of political speech and association.
Facts:
- Federal law, specifically the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), imposed two types of campaign contribution limits on individuals: base limits for contributions to a specific candidate or committee, and aggregate limits for total contributions to all candidates and committees combined.
- For the 2013-2014 election cycle, the aggregate limits capped an individual's total contributions at $48,600 to all federal candidates and $74,600 to all other political committees.
- In the 2011-2012 election cycle, Shaun McCutcheon contributed $33,088 to 16 different federal candidates, complying with the base limits for each contribution.
- McCutcheon wished to contribute $1,776 to 12 additional candidates but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to candidates.
- McCutcheon also wished to contribute more than the aggregate limit allowed to other political committees, including $25,000 to each of the three Republican national party committees.
- The Republican National Committee (RNC) wished to receive the contributions that McCutcheon and other similarly situated individuals were legally barred from making due to the aggregate limits.
Procedural Posture:
- Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee (RNC) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a court of first instance, challenging the constitutionality of the aggregate contribution limits.
- The case was heard by a special three-judge panel as required by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.
- The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the limits, and the government moved to dismiss the complaint.
- The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the government's motion to dismiss, upholding the aggregate limits.
- McCutcheon and the RNC, as appellants, filed a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, with the government as the appellee.
- The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to hear the case.
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Issue:
Does the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's aggregate limit on the total amount an individual can contribute to all federal candidates, parties, and political committees in an election cycle violate the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Plurality - Chief Justice Roberts
Yes, the aggregate limits on campaign contributions violate the First Amendment. These limits impose a substantial burden on an individual's First Amendment rights to political speech and association by restricting the number of candidates and committees one can support, without being closely drawn to the government's legitimate interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. The only permissible governmental interest in regulating campaign finance is the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, which involves a direct exchange of money for an official act, not merely gaining influence or access. The government's claim that aggregate limits are necessary to prevent circumvention of the base limits is unpersuasive, as existing statutory and regulatory safeguards, such as earmarking and anti-proliferation rules, already address these concerns, and the hypothetical circumvention scenarios are implausible. The aggregate limits are a poorly tailored, 'prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis' approach when less restrictive alternatives, like enhanced disclosure or targeted transfer restrictions, are available.
Concurring - Justice Thomas
Yes, the aggregate limits are unconstitutional, but the Court should have gone further and overruled Buckley v. Valeo entirely. The distinction between contributions and expenditures established in Buckley is flawed, as both are forms of core political speech that should receive the highest level of First Amendment protection under strict scrutiny. Contribution limits are not a marginal restriction on speech but a direct restraint on political communication and association. By continuing to uphold base limits while striking down aggregate limits, the Court remains in a 'halfway house' of its own design instead of restoring a standard faithful to the First Amendment.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
No, the aggregate limits do not violate the First Amendment and are a constitutional means of preserving the integrity of the democratic process. The plurality adopts an improperly narrow definition of 'corruption' that is limited to explicit bribery, ignoring the broader and more significant governmental interest in preventing 'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment' and ensuring that government is responsive to citizens, not just wealthy donors. Without aggregate limits, the decision creates a loophole allowing a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or a candidate's campaign through various well-known circumvention techniques involving joint fundraising committees and multiple PACs. This will allow a few large donors to drown out the voices of the many, subverting the political process and undermining public confidence in democracy. The decision wrongly overrules precedent and 'eviscerates our Nation’s campaign finance laws.'
Analysis:
This decision significantly alters the landscape of campaign finance law by eliminating the overall cap on how much an individual can contribute in a two-year election cycle. It solidifies the Roberts Court's narrow definition of corruption as being limited to direct quid pro quo arrangements, thereby rejecting broader concerns about the potential for wealthy donors to gain disproportionate access and influence. While the base limits on contributions to individual candidates remain, the ruling allows donors to give to an unlimited number of candidates and committees, potentially funneling millions into the political system and increasing the power of a small number of affluent donors. The case places a higher burden on the government to justify any campaign finance regulation as a narrowly tailored measure to prevent explicit bribery, rather than a prophylactic rule to protect the integrity of the political process.
