McCray v. Illinois
386 U.S. 300 (1967)
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Rule of Law:
The U.S. Constitution does not require states to compel the disclosure of a confidential informant's identity at a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for a warrantless arrest, so long as the judge is satisfied that the arresting officers relied in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable informant.
Facts:
- On January 16, 1964, a confidential informant told Chicago police officers that McCray was selling narcotics, had drugs on his person, and could be found in a specific area.
- The arresting officers had known the informant for about a year, and he had provided accurate information about narcotics activities at least fifteen to twenty-five times previously, leading to numerous arrests and convictions.
- The officers drove to the specified vicinity in an unmarked car.
- The informant, who was with the officers, pointed out McCray and then departed on foot.
- Officers observed McCray walking with a woman, separating from her, meeting another man, and then proceeding alone.
- After seeing the police car, McCray hurried between two buildings.
- The officers stopped McCray, informed him they had information he was carrying narcotics, and placed him in their car.
- A search of McCray's person revealed a package containing heroin.
Procedural Posture:
- McCray was indicted in an Illinois state trial court for unlawful possession of narcotics.
- Prior to trial, McCray filed a motion to suppress the heroin evidence, alleging it was seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
- The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion, during which it sustained the prosecution's objections to questions seeking the informant's identity.
- The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
- McCray was subsequently convicted of possession of narcotics.
- McCray appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review McCray's constitutional claim.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation require a state to compel the disclosure of a confidential informant's identity at a pretrial hearing to determine probable cause for a warrantless arrest and search?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stewart
No. Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause requires a state to disclose a confidential informant's identity in a pretrial probable cause hearing. The court recognized a well-established testimonial privilege for government informants, grounded in the public interest of encouraging citizens to communicate their knowledge of crimes to law enforcement. The court distinguished this case from Roviaro v. United States, which required disclosure during the trial itself where the informant was a key participant in the crime and his testimony was essential to determining guilt or innocence. Here, the issue is not guilt, but the preliminary question of probable cause. The court held that a judge, after hearing the officers' sworn testimony in open court and observing their cross-examination, is capable of assessing their credibility and determining if they reasonably relied on a trustworthy informant. To mandate disclosure in every such hearing would be an unjustifiable encroachment on the states' power to create their own rules of evidence and would assume police perjury. Finally, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was satisfied because McCray was able to confront and cross-examine the officers, who were the witnesses against him at the hearing; the informant did not testify.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
Yes. The Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause is not met when the police are the sole arbiters of their informant's reliability. By allowing officers to withhold the informant's identity, the court effectively entrusts the Fourth Amendment to the police and makes it impossible for the defense or the judiciary to verify the informant's existence or reliability. The dissent argued that without disclosure and the opportunity for cross-examination, the court can never truly know if probable cause existed, and the officer's own testimony becomes conclusive. This practice encourages warrantless arrests, contrary to the Fourth Amendment's preference for a neutral magistrate to make probable cause determinations. The dissent contended that the rule from Roviaro should apply, requiring disclosure to ensure a fair determination of the issue.
Analysis:
McCray v. Illinois constitutionally validates the 'informer's privilege' at the state level within the context of pretrial suppression hearings. The decision establishes a crucial distinction between the trial phase, where an informant's testimony may be essential for a fair determination of guilt, and the preliminary phase, where the focus is on police conduct. By granting trial judges discretion to protect an informant's identity based on an assessment of officer credibility, the Court reinforced law enforcement's ability to utilize confidential sources. This ruling significantly impacts Fourth Amendment litigation by limiting a defendant's ability to challenge the basis for a warrantless arrest when it stems from a confidential tip, thereby balancing the needs of law enforcement against individual procedural rights.
