McCollum v. Board of Education
333 U.S. 203 (1948)
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Rule of Law:
The use of a state's tax-supported public school system, property, and compulsory attendance machinery to provide religious instruction by private religious groups violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Facts:
- In Champaign, Illinois, a voluntary association of Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant groups, known as the Champaign Council on Religious Education, was formed.
- The Council received permission from the Champaign Board of Education to offer religious instruction classes to public school students in grades four through nine.
- Classes were held weekly for 30-45 minutes inside public school classrooms during the regular school day.
- Parents could sign printed cards to request their children be permitted to attend.
- Religious teachers were employed by the Council, at no cost to the school, but were subject to the approval and supervision of the school superintendent.
- Students who attended the religious classes were released from their secular studies for that period.
- Students who did not participate in the religious classes were required to leave their classrooms and go to another location in the school building to pursue secular activities.
- Attendance at the religious classes was monitored, and reports of presence or absence were submitted to the students' secular teachers.
Procedural Posture:
- Vashti McCollum filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Champaign Board of Education in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois, a state court of first instance.
- The trial court denied the petition, finding the religious instruction program did not violate the state or federal constitution.
- McCollum appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- McCollum appealed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a 'released time' program that permits private religious teachers to provide religious instruction in public school classrooms during regular school hours violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Black
Yes, the program violates the Establishment Clause. The use of tax-supported property for religious instruction and the close cooperation between school authorities and religious groups demonstrates that the state is unconstitutionally aiding religion. The program falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment as interpreted in Everson v. Board of Education, which established that neither a state nor the Federal Government can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Here, the state's compulsory public school machinery provides an invaluable aid to sectarian groups by helping to provide pupils for their religious classes. This practice is not a separation of Church and State; it breaches the 'high and impregnable' wall that must be maintained between them.
Concurring - Justice Frankfurter
Yes, the Constitution forbids the commingling of sectarian with secular instruction in public schools. The principle of separation of Church and State is not a mere phrase but a fundamental concept rooted in American history, developed to avoid the divisive conflicts that arise from religious entanglement in public life. The Champaign program is not a neutral accommodation but an active integration of religious education into the school's working scheme, creating powerful elements of inherent pressure on children to conform. The public school must remain a symbol of our secular unity, scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects, leaving religious indoctrination to the church and home. Separation means separation, not something less.
Concurring - Justice Jackson
Yes, but with reservations. While concurring that the Champaign plan is unconstitutional, there are serious doubts about jurisdiction, as the complainant has shown neither legal compulsion on her son nor a substantial, measurable taxpayer injury. The decision risks making the Court a 'super board of education' for every school district, arbitrating endless local controversies. Completely isolating secular education from all religious influence is impractical and may not be desirable, as religion is deeply embedded in history, art, and literature. While formal religious instruction like this plan must be prohibited, courts must be careful not to lay down a sweeping doctrine that would leave public education in shreds.
Dissenting - Justice Reed
No, the program does not violate the Establishment Clause. The majority's interpretation of 'aid' is too broad and its reliance on the 'wall of separation' metaphor is misplaced, as a rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech. Historically, there are many examples of friendly cooperation between church and state—such as chaplains in the military and Congress—that are widely accepted and not considered an establishment of religion. The Champaign plan does not establish a church or compel religious belief; it is a permissible accommodation of the religious interests of its citizens. The 'aid' provided is incidental, and the decision wrongly thwarts the desire of states to permit voluntary religious education.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the 'wall of separation' doctrine from Everson v. Board of Education and applied it directly to prohibit religious instruction within public schools. The Court established that the Establishment Clause is violated not only by direct financial aid but also by the state's use of its facilities and compulsory education system to facilitate sectarian education. This ruling set a strict precedent against on-campus 'released time' programs and prompted legal challenges to similar programs nationwide. It also set the stage for subsequent jurisprudence, such as Zorach v. Clauson, which would distinguish this case by permitting 'released time' programs conducted off school grounds.
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