McClure v. Thompson
323 F.3d 1233 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney's disclosure of confidential client information does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel if the attorney holds an objectively reasonable belief that the disclosure is necessary to prevent a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, even if the attorney has some doubts and did not obtain the client's fully informed consent.
Facts:
- On April 24, 1984, Carol Jones was found murdered in her home, and her two children, Michael (14) and Tanya (10), were missing.
- Robert McClure, a friend of Jones whose fingerprints were found in blood at the scene, was arrested for the murder on April 28.
- McClure's mother hired attorney Christopher Mecca to represent him.
- Over the next three days, McClure revealed to Mecca the separate, remote locations of the children's bodies, providing a hand-drawn map.
- During their conversations, McClure made ambiguous statements, including that "Jesus saved the kids," leading Mecca to believe there was a possibility they were still alive.
- Believing he had a duty to act if the children might be alive, Mecca arranged for his secretary to anonymously call the sheriff's department with the information from the map.
- Police subsequently located the bodies of the two children, who had each died from a single gunshot wound to the head.
- Mecca then withdrew from representing McClure.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert McClure was convicted of three counts of aggravated murder by a jury in an Oregon state trial court.
- On direct appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review.
- McClure filed a petition for post-conviction relief in an Oregon circuit court, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, which was denied.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, and the Oregon Supreme Court again denied review.
- McClure then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon.
- The federal district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied McClure's habeas petition.
- McClure, the appellant, appealed the district court's denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a defense attorney provide constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel by anonymously disclosing the location of a client's victims based on a reasonable belief that the disclosure is necessary to prevent imminent death, even without the client's fully informed consent?
Opinions:
Majority - Fletcher, J.
No. A defense attorney's disclosure of confidential information does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel if the attorney reasonably believed the disclosure was necessary to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily harm. Under the Strickland standard, attorney performance is measured by 'reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.' While the duty of confidentiality is fundamental, it is not absolute and is subject to an exception allowing disclosure to prevent a client's criminal act likely to result in imminent death. Here, Mecca's consultation with McClure was insufficient to obtain informed consent. However, his disclosure was justified under the future harm exception. The standard for this exception is objective reasonableness, not a 'firm factual basis.' Deferring to the district court's factual findings, McClure deliberately withheld the children's true condition, leading Mecca to believe they might be alive. Given the ambiguous statements from McClure and the extreme circumstances, Mecca's belief and his resulting investigation were not unreasonable. Furthermore, Mecca's concern for the children's welfare did not create an actual conflict of interest because he also believed finding the children alive could benefit his client by avoiding additional murder charges, and acting to prevent a crime is consistent with an attorney's ethical duties.
Dissenting - Ferguson, J.
Yes. The attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient because his disclosure was based on an unreasonable belief that the children were alive, supported by virtually no investigation. The majority's 'objective reasonableness' standard is unguided and wrongly rejects the 'firm factual basis' test required in analogous situations, such as client perjury. Mecca's belief was based on wishful thinking, not credible evidence; his own notes referred to 'bodies' and he admitted his belief was not a 'strong possibility.' A reasonable attorney would have conducted a more thorough investigation before breaching the sacrosanct duty of confidentiality, such as directly asking McClure if the children were dead or visiting the locations himself. Mecca’s attempt to first negotiate a plea deal undermines his claim that his actions were driven by an urgent need to save the children. His conduct fell below prevailing professional norms and constituted a violation of McClure's Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the application of the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel where an attorney's duty of confidentiality conflicts with the ethical permission to prevent imminent harm. The court sets a precedent by adopting an 'objective reasonableness' standard for the attorney's belief, which is highly deferential to the attorney's judgment in fast-moving, high-stakes situations. By rejecting the stricter 'firm factual basis' test, the decision gives attorneys more latitude to disclose information to prevent death or serious injury, potentially lowering the threshold for breaching one of the legal profession's core duties. This ruling will likely influence how future courts evaluate similar ethical dilemmas faced by criminal defense lawyers.
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