McClenahan v. Cooley
806 S.W.2d 767 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
An owner of a motor vehicle who leaves the keys in the ignition of the unattended vehicle in a location accessible to the public may be held liable for the subsequent negligent acts of a thief. The intervening criminal act of the thief does not automatically sever the chain of proximate causation as a matter of law; foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury.
Facts:
- On May 20, 1988, Glenn Cooley, a law enforcement officer, parked his car in the public parking lot of a shopping center.
- Cooley left the keys in the ignition of his unattended vehicle while he went inside a bank to conduct business.
- A thief stole Cooley's car and was subsequently spotted by a state trooper.
- A high-speed chase ensued on a busy highway during the middle of the day.
- Twenty minutes after the theft, the thief ran a red light at over 80 miles per hour and collided with a vehicle driven by William McClenahan's wife.
- The collision resulted in the deaths of Mrs. McClenahan, her viable unborn child, and her four-year-old son.
- Another child in the McClenahan vehicle sustained substantial injuries but survived.
Procedural Posture:
- William McClenahan filed a wrongful death and personal injury lawsuit against Glenn Cooley in the Circuit Court of Bradley County, the trial court.
- Cooley filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
- The trial court granted Cooley's motion and dismissed the lawsuit.
- McClenahan, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that the thief's negligence insulated Cooley, the appellee, from liability.
- McClenahan, as appellant, was granted permission to appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Does the intervening criminal act of a car thief automatically break the chain of causation, as a matter of law, relieving the owner who negligently left the keys in the ignition of an unattended car from liability for injuries caused by the thief?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Drowota
No. The intervening criminal act of a thief does not automatically break the chain of causation as a matter of law. A vehicle owner who leaves keys in the ignition of an unattended car in a publicly accessible area may be found liable for injuries caused by a thief, as the foreseeability of both the theft and the thief's subsequent negligent driving is a question of fact for a jury. The court rejected the prior distinction between public and private property, holding that common law negligence principles should apply regardless of where the car is parked. It reasoned that reasonable minds could differ on whether a person of ordinary prudence should foresee the theft and the increased risk to the public. Therefore, the issues of proximate cause and superseding intervening cause should be decided by a jury based on the specific circumstances of the case, not dismissed by a judge as a matter of law.
Analysis:
This decision significantly changed Tennessee tort law by abandoning the bright-line rule that insulated car owners from liability if their vehicle was stolen from private property. By focusing on foreseeability under common law negligence, the court aligned Tennessee with a growing minority of jurisdictions and empowered juries to determine liability based on the specific facts of a case. This ruling expands potential liability for vehicle owners and emphasizes that a criminal act is not an automatic bar to finding proximate cause if that act was a foreseeable consequence of the initial negligence.
