McCallister v. Nelson
411 S.E.2d 456, 1991 W. Va. LEXIS 176, 186 W. Va. 131 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A municipal charter provision granting the mayor veto power over city council ordinances and resolutions is a valid exercise of municipal authority if it is fairly incidental to or reasonably implied from the powers granted by the state legislature and is not inconsistent or in conflict with the state constitution or general laws.
Facts:
- In 1985, the City of Huntington adopted a new charter, which included Section 2.7, granting the mayor the ability to veto decisions of the city council.
- The City of Huntington chose the 'strong mayor plan' for its government structure, which designates the mayor as the administrative authority and the council as the governing body.
- On October 23, 1989, a member of the Huntington City Council introduced an ordinance to protect a proposed east-west corridor from further development, allegedly to block the construction of a 20-unit apartment complex for the mentally disabled.
- The Huntington City Council approved this ordinance by a vote of seven to four on November 13, 1989.
- The Mayor, relying on Section 2.7 of the City Charter, subsequently vetoed the approved ordinance.
- An attempt by the City Council to override the Mayor's veto failed because it did not achieve the required two-thirds majority vote.
Procedural Posture:
- A member of the Charter Board (the appellee) filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Cabell County, seeking a determination of the mayor's power to veto ordinances.
- On April 23, 1990, the Cabell County Circuit Court issued an opinion ruling that a mayor in West Virginia may not have the power to veto.
- The Mayor filed a petition for appeal from the Circuit Court's ruling to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
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Issue:
Does a municipal charter provision that grants a mayor the power to veto ordinances and resolutions of the city council constitute a valid exercise of municipal power under West Virginia Code § 8-1-7 and the West Virginia Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - BROTHERTON, Justice
Yes, a municipal charter provision granting the mayor veto power over city council ordinances and resolutions is a valid exercise of municipal power. The Court found no state law or constitutional provision that was violated by the veto provision. While the statute or Constitution does not specifically enumerate a mayoral veto power, W.Va.Code § 8-1-7 allows municipalities to exercise "other powers and authority fairly incidental thereto or reasonably implied" and within the chapter's purposes. Furthermore, the "Home Rule Amendment" (Art. VI, sec. 39(a)) grants electors of municipal corporations the power to frame and adopt charters and pass laws relating to municipal affairs, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution or general state laws. Given that Huntington chose a 'strong mayor plan,' which implies significant administrative authority for the mayor, the veto power is considered 'reasonably implied and fairly incidental' to the mayor's role and the city's self-governance. The appellee failed to overcome the presumption of immunity from judicial interference that municipal legislative enactments are afforded.
Analysis:
This case significantly strengthens the autonomy of West Virginia municipalities operating under home rule charters, particularly those adopting a 'strong mayor' form of government. By interpreting the grant of municipal power to include those 'reasonably implied and fairly incidental,' the Court broadens the scope of permissible charter provisions beyond express legislative grants. This ruling affirms that the absence of explicit state authorization does not automatically invalidate a local power, particularly when it aligns with the chosen governmental structure and does not conflict with higher law. It reinforces the principle that courts generally defer to municipal legislative enactments unless a clear conflict with state law or the constitution is demonstrated.
