McCaffrey v. City of Wilmington
2016 WL 446946, 133 A.3d 536, 2016 Del. LEXIS 55 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
Governmental entities and their employees are generally immune from tort claims under the Delaware Tort Claims Act, with an exception for employees who act with “wanton negligence” and for entities whose negligent use of specified equipment causes harm.
Facts:
- On June 4, 2010, Officer Michael Spencer, off-duty, out of uniform, and driving his own car, attended a police academy fundraiser and then went to a bar, consuming alcohol at both.
- After leaving the bar, Officer Spencer drove under the influence and around 2:00 a.m. on June 5, 2010, ran a red light, colliding with Morgan McCaffrey's vehicle.
- Immediately after the accident, Officer Spencer showed McCaffrey his police identification, contacted WPD dispatch but then cancelled the call, asked her to handle it "civilly," and kissed her.
- Officer Spencer suggested moving their damaged cars near McCaffrey's apartment, then asked McCaffrey to hold his gun, magazine, and badge, which she did, feeling she had to comply due to his police status.
- Officer Spencer suggested they go to McCaffrey's apartment to discuss the accident, and she agreed, again because he was a police officer.
- Once in McCaffrey's apartment, Officer Spencer undressed, made sexual advances towards her, and twice asked her to have sex, which she refused before he passed out naked in her bed.
- McCaffrey, after contacting a neighbor, called 911 at 3:52 a.m., leading to other officers finding Spencer naked and drunk in her bed.
- Prior to this incident, Officer Spencer had accumulated a record of five disciplinary incidents between 2008 and 2010, including failing to report for work after drinking, improper investigation of an off-duty officer altercation, a domestic dispute where he appeared intoxicated and drove with his gun, a collision while driving after drinking and failing to report it, and improper taser reporting.
Procedural Posture:
- Morgan McCaffrey filed her initial complaint in Superior Court, alleging various claims against Officer Spencer, the City of Wilmington (City), the Wilmington Police Department (WPD), and several other WPD members.
- The City moved to dismiss Count I (auto accident) and Count II (federal civil rights), while the WPD moved to dismiss all claims.
- The Superior Court dismissed the WPD as not being an independent entity subject to suit and dismissed the City from Count II, citing no respondeat superior liability for federal civil rights claims.
- The Superior Court also dismissed the City from Count I, determining Officer Spencer was not acting within the scope of his employment during the traffic accident itself.
- McCaffrey subsequently filed first and second amended complaints in Superior Court, which removed the WPD as a defendant, added Chief Szczerba and other individual officers, and notably deleted the City as a defendant and all respondeat superior allegations from Count I.
- The Superior Court granted motions to dismiss assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against the City and individual officers, finding immunity under the Tort Claims Act due to a lack of pleaded physical injury.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the individual officer defendants and the City on the federal civil rights claims, finding no constitutional deprivation or municipal policy/custom link, and no respondeat superior.
- Initially, the Superior Court also granted summary judgment on the state-law Supervisory Liability claim (Count IV) against Chief Szczerba and the City, mistakenly believing it to be a federal claim, but later partially vacated this ruling upon reconsideration.
- Chief Szczerba and the City then moved for summary judgment on the state-law Supervisory Liability claim in Superior Court, which was granted, with the court finding them immune under the Tort Claims Act because: 1) Chief Szczerba did not exhibit "conscious indifference" given WPD's disciplinary actions, and 2) the City's hiring, retention, and supervision decisions were discretionary functions.
- McCaffrey requested, and the Superior Court entered, a final judgment on January 5, 2018, as to the City, the individual officers, and Chief Szczerba, allowing the appeal to proceed while claims against Officer Spencer personally remained pending.
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Issue:
1. Does the Delaware Tort Claims Act's "wanton negligence" exception apply to a police chief for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of an officer with a history of disciplinary issues? 2. Does the Act's "equipment" exception apply to a city when an off-duty officer uses his personal police identification, badge, and gun to exert influence but these items do not directly cause property damage, bodily injury, or death?
Opinions:
Majority - Seitz, Justice
No, Chief Szczerba and the City are immune under the Tort Claims Act. Chief Szczerba did not act with wanton negligence in hiring, retaining, or supervising Officer Spencer, and the City is not liable under the equipment exception as Spencer's police accoutrements did not cause harm. The court affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of claims against Chief Szczerba and the City. Regarding the City's liability for the auto accident and sexual advances (Count I), McCaffrey explicitly dropped the City as a defendant and removed all 'respondeat superior' allegations in her amended complaints, thereby eliminating any claim against the City under that count. McCaffrey also conceded that the City was immune from suit under Count V (assault and battery). For Chief Szczerba's supervisory liability for alleged wanton negligence, the court found insufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact. Wanton conduct requires "conscious indifference" or an "I-don't-care" attitude where the probability of harm is reasonably apparent. Pre-hiring, Officer Spencer's record had some blemishes (minor traffic violations, admitted past marijuana and unreported DUI incidents), but his background checks were largely positive, and a psychiatrist described him as a "man of some integrity." The court concluded this did not demonstrate wanton negligence in his hiring, as police departments cannot be expected to reject all candidates with minor issues. Post-hiring, Spencer had five disciplinary incidents before the McCaffrey incident. The WPD investigated each and issued reprimands or counseling. The Chief of Police's role in internal discipline is primarily as an arbiter of appeals, not direct involvement in every low-level case; thus, his lack of personal involvement did not equate to an "I-don't-care" attitude. Furthermore, the role of alcohol in Spencer's prior incidents was often not known to the WPD until after the McCaffrey incident, and the court emphasized avoiding hindsight bias in evaluating Szczerba's conduct. For the City's liability under the Tort Claims Act's "equipment exception," the court found that Officer Spencer's weapon, badge, and police identification did not fall under the statutory definition of "other machinery or equipment." This exception applies to items like motor vehicles, special mobile equipment, or other machinery of a similar nature that cause harm. Since Spencer's personal accoutrements did not directly cause property damage, bodily injury, or death to McCaffrey, the exception was inapplicable, and the City remained immune.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Strine, C.J.
Yes, there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether Chief Szczerba acted with wanton negligence in supervising Officer Spencer. While concurring with the majority on other points, the Chief Justice dissented on Szczerba's immunity. Chief Justice Strine argued that Chief Szczerba's defense of ignorance is insufficient if he failed to ensure a credible and good-faith system of officer supervision and discipline. Officer Spencer's pre-hiring record, including admitted prior drug use and drinking problems, should have prompted greater scrutiny when he began to show a pattern of recurring problematic behavior as an officer. Between 2008 and 2010, Spencer was involved in five disciplinary incidents that, taken together, suggested a lack of judgment, a propensity to mix alcohol with driving and carrying a gun, and a tendency to treat police-involved situations differently from those involving ordinary citizens. Specifically, Spencer's past included missing work due to drinking, an improper investigation of an off-duty officer bar fight, a domestic dispute where he appeared drunk and drove with his weapon, and a collision after drinking in a police car, which he failed to report properly. The disciplinary actions for these incidents were merely written reprimands, often without requirements for treatment or behavioral change. Furthermore, the response to the McCaffrey incident itself was highly troubling: a dispatcher did not report Spencer's drunkenness, responding officers were dismissive of McCaffrey's account, and a high-ranking captain repeatedly instructed a lieutenant to delay timely blood alcohol testing of Spencer. This pattern, combined with the apparent "broom" approach to investigations where officer misconduct was handled differently than citizen misconduct, raises a genuine question for a jury as to whether Chief Szczerba exhibited "conscious indifference" or an "I-don't-care attitude" regarding the functioning and credibility of the disciplinary system under his oversight. A reasonable juror could conclude that Spencer's dangerous behavior was predictable given his history, and that any lack of knowledge by Szczerba was due to an institutional indifference amounting to wanton negligence.
Analysis:
This case establishes a stringent standard for piercing governmental immunity under the Delaware Tort Claims Act. The majority's narrow interpretation of "wanton negligence" emphasizes a direct, explicit "I-don't-care" attitude and direct knowledge, making it exceedingly difficult to hold supervisory officials liable for alleged systemic failures or an "unawareness" that could be seen as deliberate. The decision also strictly construes the "equipment" exception, limiting it to items causing direct physical harm that are similar in nature to vehicles or machinery. The dissenting opinion, however, highlights the potential for a "broom" approach to internal discipline and institutional indifference to meet the "wanton negligence" standard, suggesting a tension in how courts should evaluate supervisory liability when officials claim ignorance of issues within their purview, particularly in cases involving repeated misconduct by officers.
