No. An airplane is not a 'motor vehicle' according to this specific law. The court said that when people hear the word 'vehicle,' they think of something that travels on the ground, like a car. The law lists cars, trucks, and motorcycles, which confirms it's talking about land travel. Airplanes were around in 1919, but Congress didn't mention them in the law. Laws that create crimes have to be super clear so people have 'fair warning' about what's illegal. A court can't just decide to add airplanes to the law just because it seems like a good idea.

No, the law about stealing cars and trucks does not include airplanes. The law lists things like cars, trucks, wagons, and motorcycles, but it doesn't mention airplanes at all. When most people hear the word 'vehicle,' they think of something that moves on the ground, not something that flies. Even though airplanes were well known when the law was made in 1919, they weren't included in the law. The law should be clear and use words that most people understand. It's not fair to punish someone for something that isn't clearly against the law, even if it seems like it should be.

No, we hold that the law about stealing cars and trucks does not include airplanes. We note that the law lists things like cars, trucks, wagons, and motorcycles, but it does not mention airplanes at all. We find that when most people hear the word 'vehicle,' they think of something that moves on the ground, not something that flies. Even though airplanes were well known when the law was made in 1919, they were not included. We stress that the law should be clear and use words that most people understand. It is not fair to punish someone for something that is not clearly against the law, even if it seems like it should be.

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <opinion type="majority"> <author id="b87-14"> Mr. Justice Holmes </author> delivered the opinion of the Court. The petitioner was convicted of transporting from Ottawa, Illinois, to Guymon, Oklahoma, an airplane that he knew to have been stolen, and was sentenced to serve three years’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of $2,000. The judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 43 F. (2d) 273. A writ of certiorari was granted by this Court on the question whether the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act applies to aircraft. *26 Act of October 29, 1919, c. 89, 41 Stat. 324; U. S. Code. Title 18, § 408. That Act provides: “ Sec. 2. That when used in this Act: (a) The term ‘motor vehicle’ shall include an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for .running on rails; . . . Sec. 3. That whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.” Section 2 defines the motor vehicles of which the transportation in interstate commerce is punished in § 3. The question is the meaning of the word ‘ vehicle ’ in the phrase “ any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.” No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify a conveyance working on land, water or air, and sometimes legislation extends the use in that direction, e. g., land and air, water being separately provided for, in the Tariff Act, September 22, 1922, c. 356, § 401 (b), 42 Stat. 858, 948. But in everyday speech ‘ vehicle ’ calls up the picture of a thing moving on land. Thus in Rev. Stats. § 4, intended, the Government suggests, rather to enlarge than to restrict the definition, vehicle includes every contrivance capable of being used “ as a means of transportation on land.” And this is repeated, expressly excluding aircraft, in the Tariff Act, June 17, 1930, c. 997, § 401 (b); 46 Stat. 590, 708. So here, the phrase under discussion calls up the popular picture. For after including automobile truck, automobile wagon and motor cycle, the words “ any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails ” still indicate that a vehicle in the popular sense, that is a vehicle running on land, is the theme. It is a vehicle that runs, not something, not commonly called a vehicle, that flies. Airplanes were well known in 1919, when this statute was passed; but it is admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or in the debates in Congress. *27 It is impossible to read words that so carefully enumerate the different forms of motor vehicles and have no reference of any kind to aircraft, as including airplanes under a term that usage more and more precisely confines to a different class. The counsel for the petitioner have shown that the phraseology of the statute as to motor vehicles follows that of earlier statutes of Connecticut, Delaware, Ohio, Michigan and Missouri, not to .mention the late Regulations of Traffic for the District of Columbia, Title 6, c. 9, § 242, hone of which can be supposed to leave the earth. Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used. United States v. Third, 261 U. S. 204, 209. Judgment reversed. </opinion>

A] fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed

When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used.

—utilizing the ejusdem generis principle in determining that "automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" did not apply to an airplane

The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.

Mr. Justice Holmes had to decide whether an aeroplane is a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Theft Act.

The "rule of lenity" provides that if, and only if, a criminal statute is ambiguous, that ambiguity should be resolved "as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered." Id

The rule of lenity is motivated by the principle of "fair warning" and requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed in favor of the accused.

No. The term 'motor vehicle' in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act does not encompass an airplane because the statute's language and context refer to vehicles that operate on land. The court reasoned that in everyday language, the word 'vehicle' evokes the image of a device for land transportation. The statute's specific enumeration of automobiles, trucks, and motorcycles reinforces this interpretation, suggesting that the general phrase 'any other self-propelled vehicle' is limited to the same class of land-based conveyances. Although airplanes were well-known when the Act was passed in 1919, they were not mentioned in the legislative debates or reports. Crucially, criminal laws must provide 'fair warning' in language that the public can commonly understand, and a court should not extend a statute's reach to include unenumerated items, even if a similar policy might apply.

No, the term 'motor vehicle' in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act does not include aircraft. The Act defines 'motor vehicle' to include automobiles, trucks, wagons, motorcycles, and any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails. In everyday speech, 'vehicle' refers to a conveyance moving on land. The statute carefully enumerates different forms of motor vehicles without any reference to aircraft, even though airplanes were well known when the law was passed in 1919. The phraseology of the statute follows that of earlier state laws, none of which can be supposed to include aircraft. Although a criminal may not carefully consider the law's text, it is reasonable that fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand. To make the warning fair, the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft simply because a similar policy may apply or upon speculation that the legislature would have used broader words if it had thought of it.

McBoyle v. United States

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