Mazzagatti v. Everingham by Everingham
516 A.2d 672, 512 Pa. 266 (1986)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
To establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a bystander, the plaintiff must have a sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident that caused the injury to a close relative; arriving at the scene minutes after the event is insufficient.
Facts:
- On August 12, 1980, a car operated by Ricky Allen Everingham struck and fatally injured fourteen-year-old Mumtaz Mazzagatti as she was riding her bicycle.
- The accident occurred in a residential area near Mumtaz's home.
- At the time of the collision, Mumtaz's mother, Jane Mazzagatti, was at her workplace approximately one mile away.
- Immediately after the collision, Jane Mazzagatti received a telephone call informing her that her daughter had been in an accident.
- Mazzagatti arrived at the scene a few minutes after the collision and observed her daughter lying injured in the road.
- As a result of observing her injured daughter, Mazzagatti suffered severe emotional distress, including hysteria, shock, depression, and flashbacks.
Procedural Posture:
- Jane Mazzagatti and her husband filed a complaint in trespass against Ricky Allen Everingham in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County.
- The complaint included a count for negligent infliction of emotional distress suffered by Jane Mazzagatti.
- Everingham (appellee) filed a motion for summary judgment in the nature of a demurrer to dismiss Mazzagatti's NIED claim.
- The Court of Common Pleas granted Everingham's motion for summary judgment.
- The Mazzagattis (appellants) appealed the trial court's order to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted the appellants' petition for allowance of appeal (allocatur).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a close relative who does not witness an accident but arrives at the scene minutes later and observes the injured victim state a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Nix, C.J.
No. A close relative who arrives at the scene of an accident after it has occurred, even minutes later, does not state a valid claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because they lack the required sensory and contemporaneous observance of the injury-causing event. The court reaffirmed the three-part test from Sinn v. Burd, which requires that a bystander's shock result from the 'direct emotional impact' of observing the accident. Public policy and principles of proximate cause demand a clear cut-off point for liability. The court reasoned that a relative who learns of the accident from a third party has a 'buffer' against the full emotional impact, unlike one who witnesses the event directly. Therefore, the defendant's duty of care does not extend to a plaintiff who was not present at the scene and did not perceive the negligent act as it happened.
Concurring - Flaherty, J.
No. While joining the majority, this opinion emphasizes the need to re-evaluate the social utility of an expanding tort system. The author, who previously dissented on a similar issue, now believes that courts must draw limits on tort recovery to prevent adverse societal consequences, such as increased insurance premiums, taxes, and consumer prices. The tort system must be protected from 'excess' to remain viable and workable.
Concurring - Hutchinson, J.
No. This opinion concurs only in the result, disagreeing with the majority's mixture of foreseeability and causation analysis. The proper analysis is legal cause, which asks whether the defendant's conduct was a 'substantial factor' in bringing about the harm and whether any rule of law relieves the actor from liability. Here, liability is precluded because the mother's claim is essentially for solatium (grief and bereavement), which has long been held non-recoverable in the Commonwealth.
Dissenting - Larsen, J.
Yes. The mother should be permitted to state a claim because her severe emotional distress was a natural and foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. This opinion sharply criticizes the majority for basing its legal reasoning on the 'insurance crisis,' arguing that it is inappropriate for the court to take a side in a complex socio-economic debate. Such policy decisions should be left to the legislature, not used by courts to deny redress to deserving plaintiffs.
Dissenting - Papadakos, J.
Yes. Denying the mother's claim draws an arbitrary and unjust line that closes the courthouse doors to a person who suffered a substantial wrong. The emotional trauma of arriving moments after an accident to see one's child mangled is no less severe than witnessing the impact itself. The guiding principle should be providing a remedy for every substantial injury, and whether the mother's harm is real and was caused by the defendant's negligence is a question that should be decided by a jury.
Analysis:
This case solidifies a strict, bright-line rule for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in Pennsylvania, definitively requiring contemporaneous sensory perception of the injury-causing event. By rejecting a more flexible foreseeability standard, the court significantly narrows the scope of potential liability for tortfeasors. The decision reflects a judicial trend of containing the expansion of tort law, explicitly citing public policy concerns about the economic costs of litigation. This precedent makes it exceptionally difficult for individuals who are not direct eyewitnesses to an accident to recover for emotional distress, even when they experience profound trauma from observing the immediate aftermath.
Unlock the full brief for Mazzagatti v. Everingham by Everingham