Mayor of New York v. Miln
11 Pet. 102 (1837)
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Rule of Law:
A state law enacted under the state's police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens is not an unconstitutional regulation of commerce, even if it incidentally affects individuals arriving from foreign ports, so long as it does not conflict with a federal law.
Facts:
- On February 11, 1824, the New York legislature passed a law aimed at addressing the influx of passengers arriving by ship.
- The law required the master of any ship arriving from a foreign port or another U.S. state to submit a written report to the mayor of New York City.
- This report had to detail the name, birthplace, last legal settlement, age, and occupation of every passenger.
- The law imposed a penalty of $75 for each passenger not reported, payable by the ship's master, owner, or consignee.
- In August 1829, the ship Emily, captained by William Thompson, arrived in New York from Liverpool, England, with 100 passengers.
- George Miln was the consignee of the ship Emily.
- Thompson, the ship's master, failed to provide the required report for the 100 passengers.
Procedural Posture:
- The Mayor of the City of New York filed an action of debt against George Miln in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
- The lawsuit sought to recover penalties for the failure of the master of the ship Emily to report passenger information as required by a New York statute.
- Miln, the defendant, demurred to the declaration, arguing that the New York law was an unconstitutional regulation of commerce.
- The judges of the circuit court were divided in opinion on the constitutional question.
- The circuit court certified the question of the law's constitutionality to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a New York state law requiring the master of a vessel arriving in the port of New York to provide a detailed report on all passengers on board constitute an unconstitutional regulation of foreign commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Barbour
No, the New York law does not constitute an unconstitutional regulation of commerce. The Court held that the act is not a regulation of commerce, but rather a regulation of police, and therefore a valid exercise of a power that rightfully belongs to the states. The purpose of the law was not to regulate commerce but to prevent the state from being burdened by an influx of indigent persons, a legitimate goal under the state's reserved police powers to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of its people. The Court distinguished this case from precedents like Gibbons v. Ogden, noting that this law operates on persons within the state's territory after their voyage has ended, not on the act of navigation itself. Crucially, the Court asserted that persons are not subjects of commerce in the same way as goods, and therefore state regulations affecting them do not fall under the same constitutional analysis as taxes on imports.
Concurring - Justice Thompson
No, the New York law is constitutional. Even if the subject matter of the law could be considered part of commerce, Congress has not exercised its power in a way that conflicts with this state law. The power to regulate commerce, in this instance, remains dormant. States retain the authority to legislate on subjects that may fall within the scope of the commerce power until Congress enacts conflicting legislation. This law is a component of the state's internal police power, concerning the care of paupers, a subject well within the state's legislative authority.
Dissenting - Justice Story
Yes, the New York law is an unconstitutional regulation of commerce. The transportation of passengers is a form of 'intercourse' and thus constitutes 'commerce' within the meaning of the Constitution, as established in Gibbons v. Ogden. The power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce is exclusive to Congress, and a state cannot enact laws that directly regulate this subject, even under the guise of police powers. The New York act directly imposes burdens and restraints on the introduction of passengers, which interferes with Congress's exclusive authority. Furthermore, even if the power were concurrent, Congress had already legislated on the subject of passengers in the Act of 1819, thereby occupying the field and precluding additional state regulations.
Analysis:
This decision established a significant, albeit temporary, sphere of state authority by distinguishing between the federal commerce power and the state's 'police power.' By defining the New York law as a police regulation aimed at public welfare rather than a commercial regulation, the Court allowed states to regulate individuals entering their borders. The categorical declaration that 'persons are not the subject of commerce' provided a basis for state immigration and health laws for decades. This police power doctrine created a crucial exception to the broad federal power over commerce articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, reflecting a shift towards a more states'-rights-oriented interpretation of the Constitution, though the specific holding regarding persons as non-commerce would later be overturned.
