MAYNARD v. SNAPCHAT, INC
313 Ga. 533 (2022)
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Rule of Law:
A manufacturer has a duty under Georgia decisional law to use reasonable care in designing its products to reduce reasonably foreseeable risks of harm, and this duty does not include blanket exceptions for intentional, tortious, or third-party misuse of the product.
Facts:
- On September 10, 2015, Christal McGee drove her car at 107 miles per hour.
- Right before crashing, McGee told her three passengers that she was “just trying to get the car to 100 m.p.h. to post it on Snapchat” using Snapchat’s Speed Filter.
- McGee rear-ended a car driven by Wentworth Maynard.
- Wentworth Maynard suffered severe injuries from the collision.
- Wentworth and his wife, Karen Maynard, sued Snapchat, Inc. (Snap), alleging that Snap had negligently designed the Speed Filter feature of the Snapchat application.
- The Maynards alleged that Snap had purposefully designed its products to “encourage” dangerous behaviors and could “reasonably foresee[]” that the “Speed Filter was motivating, incentivizing, or otherwise encouraging its users to drive at excessive, dangerous speeds in violation of traffic and safety laws,” and knew of other such incidents.
Procedural Posture:
- Wentworth and Karen Maynard filed a negligence claim and a derivative loss-of-consortium claim against Christal McGee and Snapchat, Inc. (Snap) in the trial court.
- Snap moved to dismiss the Maynards' second amended complaint for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings.
- The trial court granted Snap’s motion, dismissing the Maynards’ claims without leave to amend, concluding that Snap owed no legal duty to the Maynards and that proximate causation could not be established.
- The Court of Appeals of Georgia granted the Maynards’ application for an interlocutory appeal.
- A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that Snap did not owe a legal duty to the Maynards.
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Issue:
Does a manufacturer's design duty, under Georgia decisional law, extend to reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by its product, even when the injury results from a third party's intentional or tortious misuse of the product?
Opinions:
Majority - Colvin, Justice
Yes, a manufacturer's design duty under Georgia decisional law extends to reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by its product, regardless of whether the injury results from a third party's intentional or tortious misuse of the product. The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in creating a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design duty in all cases of intentional or tortious third-party use. Drawing on Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., the Court reiterated that the focus of a design-defect claim is the foreseeability of the risk of harm, not the specific 'type of use' (proper, improper, intentional, negligent, or no use at all). Georgia law also extends manufacturer liability to those 'reasonably affected' by a product, meaning injuries caused by third-party users can fall within the scope of a manufacturer's duty (CertainTeed Corp. v. Fletcher, Ogletree v. Navistar Intl. Transp. Corp.). The Maynards adequately alleged that Snap could reasonably foresee the risk of harm from the Speed Filter based on its knowledge of users attempting high speeds as a 'game' and issuing warnings against use while driving. The Court rejected Snap's argument that the Maynards sought to impose a 'duty to control' users' conduct, clarifying that the allegations instead supported the foreseeability of harm, breach of design duty, and proximate causation. It also found that Georgia's approach, which integrates foreseeability into duty, breach, and proximate cause, is not out of step with other jurisdictions, which often address similar considerations under different legal elements. Finally, public policy arguments regarding 'limitless liability' were dismissed, as existing doctrines like comparative negligence and apportionment adequately limit liability, and protecting the public from defective products remains a core policy.
Concurring - Warren, Justice
Yes, the Court correctly applies Georgia's lenient notice pleading standard and product liability law, allowing the claim to proceed, but the costs associated with litigation beyond the motion-to-dismiss stage for fact-dependent causation arguments are a concern. Justice Warren agreed with the majority's application of Georgia's legal framework to the facts and its conclusion that the Maynards sufficiently alleged a duty. However, he expressed concern that the majority's opinion did not adequately acknowledge the 'costs and burdens' manufacturers face when cases involving foreseeable but perhaps ultimately non-causal misuse proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage to summary judgment or trial. He noted that while a manufacturer might ultimately prevail on proximate causation, the expense of discovery and ongoing litigation is significant. Despite these concerns, he found the dissent's argument — that manufacturers should never owe a duty for criminal product use — to be without legal authority and inconsistent with Georgia precedent, and therefore could not join it. He concluded that policy concerns, while valid, cannot override the Court's obligation to apply existing Georgia law.
Dissenting - Bethel, Justice
No, a manufacturer's design duty should not extend to risks arising from its product being used in the commission of a crime, as such use falls beyond what is reasonably foreseeable under traditional tort principles. Justice Bethel agreed with the general principle that a manufacturer’s duty is limited to reasonably foreseeable risks. However, he argued that imposing a design duty to account for a product being used in the commission of a crime, as alleged in this case (driving 100+ mph to use a speed filter), expands the concept of 'reasonable foreseeability' beyond traditional tort law. He contended that manufacturers should only be responsible for contemplating and guarding against lawful uses of their products, not criminal misuse. Justice Bethel asserted that there is no existing Georgia decisional or common law precedent supporting a duty for manufacturers to design products to prevent their use in a crime. Alternatively, he suggested that criminal conduct by a third party should be deemed an intervening cause that breaks the chain of proximate causation as a matter of law, thus absolving the manufacturer of duty in such circumstances.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of a manufacturer's design duty in Georgia, affirming that foreseeability, not the specific type of use (intentional, tortious, or third-party), is the paramount consideration. It reinforces Georgia's position that a manufacturer may owe a duty even when a product is misused, as long as the risk of harm from such misuse is reasonably foreseeable. The decision emphasizes that general negligence principles (like a duty to control third parties) do not override specific product liability duties, and that elements like breach and proximate causation, rather than a per se duty exception, are the appropriate avenues for manufacturers to challenge claims involving misuse. This approach likely means more design defect cases will proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage, requiring deeper factual inquiries into foreseeability and causation.
