Maverick v. Perez
1921 Tex. App. LEXIS 675, 228 S.W. 148 (1921)
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Rule of Law:
A vendor's right to rescind an executory contract for the sale of land is not absolute and may be waived or lost through an unreasonable delay in asserting the right, especially when the vendee has paid a substantial portion of the purchase price, made significant improvements, and the property has increased in value.
Facts:
- On February 23, 1880, W. H. Maverick conveyed 140 acres of land to Juana Navarro y Alsbury for $700, secured by a promissory note and a vendor's lien reserved in the deed.
- Alsbury and her successors, including Alejo E. Perez, took immediate and continuous possession of the property.
- Between 1880 and 1886, several payments were made on the note, reducing the principal balance to $70.
- On April 23, 1888, Maverick's attorney sent a letter to Perez requesting payment of the remaining $70 balance.
- From April 1888 until August 1914, a period of over 26 years, Maverick made no further demand for payment or for the return of the property.
- During this period of delay, Perez and his family made improvements to the property valued at approximately $2,500.
- The value of the land, originally purchased for $700, had increased to over $5,000 by the time of the dispute.
- In 1914, when Maverick initiated contact again, Perez acknowledged the remaining debt and expressed a willingness to pay it if he could secure the funds.
Procedural Posture:
- W. H. Maverick filed suit against Alejo E. Perez in the District Court of Bexar County (trial court) to cancel a deed and recover title to the land.
- Following a trial on special issues, the jury found that the purchase money note had not been paid in full.
- The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Maverick, for recovery of the land.
- Perez, the defendant, appealed this judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment based on an error in admitting certain testimony and remanded the case for a new trial.
- The case was then brought before the Commission of Appeals for review, whose judgment was adopted by the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Does a vendor in an executory land sale contract retain the right to rescind the sale and recover the property due to a small, unpaid balance of the purchase price, after delaying enforcement for nearly 30 years, during which the vendee made substantial improvements and the property's value significantly increased?
Opinions:
Majority - McClendon, P. J.
No. The right of rescission is a harsh equitable remedy that is not absolute and can be lost through waiver; a vendor's unreasonable delay, coupled with the vendee's substantial performance and investment in the property, constitutes such a waiver. The court reasoned that rescission is cognizable only in equity and is not available where it would be inequitable to permit its exercise. Here, Maverick's right to rescind was lost due to several factors: the vast majority of the purchase price had been paid, an unreasonable amount of time (nearly 30 years) had passed since the debt was due, Maverick had accepted late payments and then remained silent for over 26 years, and during that time the defendants had expended $2,500 in improvements while the land's value enhanced to over $5,000. These facts conclusively establish a waiver and loss of the right of rescission. Furthermore, a party seeking an equitable remedy like rescission must offer to do equity, which in this case would require Maverick to tender the purchase money already received, which he failed to do.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies that a vendor's "superior title" under a vendor's lien in Texas is not an indefinite right but is subject to equitable defenses like waiver and laches. It establishes that courts will protect vendees from forfeiture where they have substantially performed their obligations and the vendor has delayed asserting their rights for an unreasonable period. This decision discourages vendors from "sleeping on their rights" in hopes of reclaiming property that has significantly increased in value due to the vendee's efforts and market changes. It reinforces the principle that rescission is a remedy of last resort, not a primary tool for enforcing a contract after long acquiescence.
