Mattos v. Agarano
661 F.3d 433, 2011 WL 4908374 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
The use of an intermediate force, such as a taser, on a non-threatening individual who is passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, officers may be entitled to qualified immunity if the unconstitutionality of their specific conduct was not clearly established by precedent at the time of the incident.
Facts:
- Case 1: Brooks v. City of Seattle (2004)
- Malaika Brooks, who was 33 years old and seven months pregnant, was pulled over for driving 32 mph in a 20 mph school zone.
- Brooks disputed the speeding violation and repeatedly refused to sign the citation, despite officers explaining that a signature was not an admission of guilt.
- After being told she was under arrest, Brooks refused to get out of her car and told the officers that she was pregnant.
- Brooks stiffened her body and clutched the steering wheel to resist being removed from the vehicle.
- An officer removed the keys from the car's ignition; the keys fell to the floor of the car.
- While one officer held Brooks's arm, another officer applied a taser in drive-stun mode to her thigh, arm, and neck over a period of approximately 42 seconds.
- Case 2: Mattos v. Agarano (2006)
- Police officers arrived at the home of Jayzel and Troy Mattos in response to a 911 call for a domestic dispute, which Jayzel had requested be made.
- Troy Mattos, who was large and smelled of alcohol, became agitated and yelled at the officers.
- When an officer announced that Troy was under arrest, Jayzel was standing between her husband and the officer.
- As the officer moved forward to arrest Troy, he pushed against Jayzel's chest, and she defensively raised her arm to stop her breasts from being smashed.
- Without any warning, an officer shot Jayzel with a taser in dart-mode, causing her to be paralyzed and fall to the floor.
Procedural Posture:
- Malaika Brooks and Jayzel Mattos filed separate lawsuits in their respective U.S. District Courts against police officers, alleging excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- In each case, the defendant officers moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
- The district court in Brooks's case denied the officers' motion, finding she had alleged a constitutional violation and the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.
- The district court in Mattos's case also denied the officers' motion, finding that disputed issues of material fact precluded a pre-trial ruling on qualified immunity.
- The officers in both cases filed interlocutory appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- Two different three-judge panels of the Ninth Circuit heard the appeals and reversed the district courts, holding that the officers in both cases were entitled to qualified immunity.
- The Ninth Circuit then voted to rehear both cases together en banc.
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Issue:
Does the use of a taser against a non-violent, passively resisting individual who poses no immediate threat constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Paez, J.
Yes. The use of a taser in these circumstances constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court's analysis under Graham v. Connor shows that the government's interest in using such force was minimal. In both cases, the crimes were minor, neither Brooks nor Mattos posed an immediate threat to officer safety (the most important factor), and their resistance was passive or minimal. In Brooks's case, the officers knew she was pregnant, had removed the keys from the car, and still tased her three times in rapid succession. In Mattos's case, officers used an intermediate level of force without warning against the non-threatening victim they were there to protect. However, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of these incidents (2004 and 2006), the law was not clearly established that this specific use of a taser was unconstitutional, as no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit precedent existed and other circuits had rejected similar claims.
Concurrence - Schroeder, J.
Yes. The use of force was excessive, but the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. I agree with the majority's reasoning and write to emphasize the non-threatening nature of the plaintiffs' conduct; both were women with children nearby who engaged in no threatening behavior. Prior cases upholding taser use involved threatening men. While one could argue the violation was obvious under Graham, the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd requires specific precedent to overcome qualified immunity, which was absent here.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Kozinski, C.J.
No. The use of a taser was reasonable and did not constitute excessive force. Brooks and Mattos breached a 'covenant of cooperation' by refusing to comply with lawful police orders. The taser is a safe and effective alternative to more dangerous uses of force like batons or physical holds. Brooks was '100 percent at fault' for escalating a routine traffic stop, and the officers acted with patience before using minimal force to effect a lawful arrest. In Mattos, officers were responding to a dangerous domestic violence call, and Jayzel interfered with the arrest of her large, angry husband. The officers' actions in both cases were constitutional.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Silverman, J.
In Brooks, no, the force was not excessive. Tasing was a 'humane way' to remove a non-compliant person from a car compared to other violent methods. In Mattos, a trial is required to determine if the force was excessive. Unlike the majority, I believe the law was clearly established in 2006 that force must be proportional to the threat. There are disputed facts as to whether Mattos's conduct was a trivial provocation or active resistance. If Mattos's version is credited, the use of a taser was clearly disproportionate, and the officers would not be entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, summary judgment should have been denied in Mattos's case.
Analysis:
This en banc decision is significant for establishing that the use of a taser on a passively resisting, non-threatening individual is a violation of the Fourth Amendment within the Ninth Circuit. While the officers in these specific cases were granted qualified immunity, the ruling itself put future officers on notice, effectively creating the 'clearly established law' that was previously missing. The case clarifies how the Graham factors apply to intermediate force weapons and reinforces that the 'immediate threat' factor is paramount. It demonstrates the two-step qualified immunity analysis, where a court can find a constitutional right was violated but still shield the officer from liability if the right was not clearly established at the time.
