Matthews v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.
959 So. 2d 910, 2007 WL 437337, 2007 La. App. LEXIS 242 (2007)
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Rule of Law:
For uninsured motorist coverage claims involving a 'phantom vehicle' with no physical contact, the statutory requirement for an 'independent and disinterested witness' is not satisfied by a person whose knowledge of the accident's cause is derived solely from the claimant's contemporaneous description, even if accompanied by corroborating sounds, without direct observation or an independent investigation of the scene.
Facts:
- On November 2, 2003, Robin Matthews was injured in an automobile accident on Highway 55 (I-55) in Copiah County, Mississippi.
- An unknown white minivan traveling in the right-hand lane of I-55 attempted to merge into the left-hand lane where Ms. Matthews was driving.
- To avoid a collision with the merging van, Ms. Matthews swerved left off I-55 into the median, causing her vehicle to begin rolling and resulting in her injuries.
- As the accident occurred, Ms. Matthews was talking on her cellular phone with her friend, Darlene Bourgeois.
- During the phone call, Ms. Matthews fearfully described the unknown vehicle merging into her lane and screamed.
- While on the phone, Ms. Bourgeois heard sounds described as 'cracking, popping and glass breaking'.
Procedural Posture:
- Robin Matthews filed suit against Shelter Mutual Insurance Company (her automobile liability insurer) seeking uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage for her injuries.
- Shelter Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting Ms. Matthews could not meet the burden of proof for an independent and disinterested witness as required by La. R.S. 22:680(1)(f).
- The trial court granted Shelter Mutual's motion for summary judgment, finding that Darlene Bourgeois did not qualify as an independent witness to the accident.
- Ms. Matthews (appellant) appealed the trial court's judgment to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a person who heard a driver describe a 'miss and run' accident on her cellular phone as it happened, and also heard glass popping and breaking as the driver’s car was damaged, qualify as an independent and disinterested witness to the accident for purposes of La. R.S. 22:680(l)(f)?
Opinions:
Majority - McDonald, J.
No, a person who heard a driver describe an accident on her cellular phone as it happened and heard related noises does not qualify as an independent and disinterested witness under La. R.S. 22:680(l)(f). The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. While Ms. Bourgeois heard Ms. Matthews' contemporaneous description and sounds of the crash, her knowledge of the cause of the accident was solely based on Ms. Matthews' version of events. Ms. Bourgeois did not personally view the accident, nor did she conduct an independent investigation of the scene shortly thereafter to form her own conclusions about the cause, unlike the investigating police officer in Wheat v. Wheat. The statute requires the witness to prove that the injury was the result of the actions of another vehicle's driver, and Ms. Bourgeois, lacking independent knowledge of how the accident occurred, could not provide such testimony. The court distinguished this case from Wheat, where an officer's independent investigation uncovered the actual cause (a transmission in the road), and aligned it with Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which held that individuals whose information about an accident is controlled by what the claimant relayed are not independent witnesses to the cause of injuries.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the stringent 'independent and disinterested witness' requirement under Louisiana's uninsured motorist statute for 'phantom vehicle' accidents (those without physical contact). It establishes that a witness's knowledge of the accident's cause must be independently derived, either through direct observation or a subsequent independent investigation of the scene. Merely hearing the claimant's contemporaneous description, even with corroborating sounds, is insufficient if the witness's understanding of causation relies solely on the claimant's narrative. This ruling sets a high bar for proving such claims, limiting the types of witnesses that can satisfy the statutory burden and emphasizing independent verification over derivative accounts, even if those accounts are immediate.
