MATTER OF HARBISON v. City of Buffalo
4 N.Y.2d 553, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958)
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Rule of Law:
A zoning ordinance may constitutionally require the termination of a lawful, pre-existing nonconforming use, provided that a reasonable amortization period is allowed for the property owner to recoup their investment and make plans for the future.
Facts:
- In 1924, Andrew Harbison, Sr., established a cooperage business (reconditioning barrels) on property he purchased in Buffalo, New York.
- At that time, the surrounding area was largely undeveloped, containing an unpaved street and a city dump.
- Over the subsequent decades, the neighborhood developed into a residential area, with homes constructed on adjacent and opposing lots.
- In 1926, the City of Buffalo zoned the area for residential use, making Harbison's business a legal, pre-existing nonconforming use.
- From 1936 through 1956, Harbison annually obtained licenses from the city to operate his business, which was classified as a 'junk yard.'
- The business involves the outdoor storage of hundreds of used steel drums, which are stacked to a height of about 10 feet.
Procedural Posture:
- The City of Buffalo notified Andrew Harbison to discontinue his business pursuant to a 1953 ordinance requiring termination of nonconforming junk yards within three years.
- The city then refused Harbison's application for a business license.
- Harbison (petitioner) initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the New York Supreme Court, Special Term (the trial court of first instance), to compel the issuance of a license.
- The Special Term granted Harbison's petition, finding the ordinance unconstitutional.
- The City of Buffalo (appellant) appealed to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's order.
- The City of Buffalo (appellant) was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York (the state's highest court).
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Issue:
Does a zoning ordinance that requires the termination of a lawful, pre-existing nonconforming use after a specified period of time constitute a taking of property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Froessel, J.
No. A zoning ordinance may require the termination of a nonconforming use after a reasonable amortization period without violating the Constitution. The court reasoned that while owners of nonconforming uses are afforded constitutional protection, this right is not perpetual. The underlying policy of zoning is the eventual elimination of uses inconsistent with the character of a neighborhood. Allowing a reasonable period for 'amortization'—during which an owner can recoup their investment and make future plans—balances the public interest in effective zoning against the private detriment to the property owner. The reasonableness of the period must be determined by weighing factors such as the nature of the business, the value of the improvements, the character of the neighborhood, and the detriment to the owner. Because the lower courts incorrectly held that such termination was per se unconstitutional, they failed to conduct this reasonableness analysis, and the case must be remanded for a factual hearing on that issue.
Dissenting - Van Voorhis, J.
Yes. A zoning ordinance that forces the termination of a lawful, pre-existing nonconforming use is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right without just compensation. The dissent argued that this decision marks 'the beginning of the end of the constitutional protection of property rights' for nonconforming uses. Zoning is intended to regulate future development, not to retroactively eliminate established, lawful businesses. Forcing termination is confiscation, and the concept of 'amortization' is merely a 'catch phrase' used to justify taking property without payment. This new rule creates an unstable and arbitrary standard, inviting endless litigation and allowing municipalities to legislate small, unpopular businesses out of existence at the behest of their neighbors.
Analysis:
This case marked a significant shift in New York's zoning jurisprudence, moving away from the principle that lawful nonconforming uses could continue in perpetuity. By introducing and validating the concept of 'amortization,' the court provided municipalities with a constitutional tool to eliminate pre-existing uses over time without resorting to eminent domain. This decision established a flexible but fact-intensive balancing test for reasonableness, which has since guided courts in determining the validity of termination periods in zoning ordinances. It fundamentally changed the landscape of land use law by prioritizing the long-term goals of community planning over the indefinite continuation of inconsistent uses.
