Matter of Estate of Killen
937 P.2d 1368, 188 Ariz. 562 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A will is invalid for lack of testamentary capacity if, at the time of its execution, the testator suffered from insane delusions about the natural objects of her bounty, and these delusions influenced the terms of her will.
Facts:
- Dorothy I. Killen's husband, Dylton, died in 1985; they had no children.
- For many years prior to Dylton's death, Killen believed he was trying to kill her, poisoning her food, and was in 'the mob'.
- Shortly before Dylton's death, Killen began having similar delusions about her nephews Russell Edward McCannon and R.C. McCannon, and her niece Carolyn Dixon, despite them providing good care.
- On February 10, 1988, psychiatrist Dr. Vinod Patel diagnosed Killen with a delusional paranoid disorder, noting her judgment was compromised by paranoid ideas that could interfere with decision-making.
- On February 17, 1988, Killen sought an attorney and subsequently met with Frank Collins to draft a will.
- On February 18, 1988, Killen executed a will bequeathing only one dollar each to Russell Edward McCannon, R.C. McCannon, and Carolyn Dixon, while leaving Marion McCannon $75,000, other personal property, and a share of the residuary estate.
- On March 9, 1988, Killen was admitted to a hospital and later transferred to a psychiatric unit, where a psychiatrist concluded she had persecutory delusions, impaired judgment, and was incapacitated by mental illness, recommending a guardian and conservator.
Procedural Posture:
- Marion McCannon applied for informal probate of Dorothy I. Killen's February 18, 1988 will in the probate court.
- The will was admitted to informal probate, and Marion McCannon was appointed personal representative.
- Russell Edward McCannon, R.C. McCannon, and Carolyn Dixon petitioned the probate court for determination of testacy, removal of Marion McCannon as personal representative, and appointment of M & I Marshall & Ilsley Trust Company of Arizona as successor personal representative, alleging Killen lacked testamentary capacity.
- The matter was tried to the probate court in September 1993.
- The probate court found that Killen lacked testamentary capacity due to a delusional paranoid disorder that influenced the will's creation and terms, declaring the will invalid, finding Killen died intestate, removing Marion McCannon, and appointing M & I Marshall & Ilsley Trust Company of Arizona as successor personal representative.
- The probate court denied Marion McCannon's motion for a new trial.
- Marion McCannon, as personal representative and in his personal capacity, appealed the probate court's order and the denial of his motion for new trial to the Court of Appeals of Arizona.
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Issue:
Does a testator lack testamentary capacity to execute a valid will if she knows the natural objects of her bounty but suffers from insane delusions about some of them that affect the terms of her will?
Opinions:
Majority - Grant, Presiding Judge
Yes, a testator lacks testamentary capacity if she knew the natural objects of her bounty but suffered from insane delusions about some of them that influenced the terms of her will. Arizona law recognizes that mental illness, specifically insane delusions, can invalidate a will if the delusions influenced its creation and terms, causing the testator to devise property differently than she would have without them, as established in cases like In re Stitt's Estate and O'Connor's Estate. The court found substantial evidence that Killen suffered from a permanent delusional paranoid disorder both before and after executing the will, which controlled her perception of Russell, R.C., and Carolyn and thus her disposition of property to them. Expert testimony indicated her animosity was based entirely on her delusion-based belief system, and her delusions were without any factual foundation, despite the care she received from them. Therefore, her mental impairment prevented a rational and lucid view of her relationships, fulfilling the criteria for lack of testamentary capacity.
Concurring - Weisberg, Judge
Yes, the testator lacked testamentary capacity under the circumstances. I agree with the reasoning and result of the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize the burden of proof required for will contestants alleging insane delusion. While the general burden is a preponderance of the evidence, Arizona Supreme Court precedent (citing In re Estate of Smith and In re Estate of Greene) suggests a higher standard where it must 'clearly appear' the testator did not understand the disposition, and the delusion must be 'utterly unfounded' and 'unwarranted.' Other states apply similar stringent proof requirements, emphasizing that any slight, inconclusive evidence providing a basis for the testator's belief, however arbitrary, negates an insane delusion. In this case, there was no evidence whatsoever to support Killen's bizarre beliefs about her relatives, and the expert testimony was exceptionally strong and unbiased, thus satisfying this higher burden.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the intersection of general testamentary capacity and insane delusions under Arizona law, confirming that even if a testator appears to satisfy the traditional three-prong capacity test (knowing property, beneficiaries, and the act of will-making), an insane delusion that materially affects the will's terms concerning natural objects of bounty will invalidate it. It emphasizes that the delusion must be unfounded in fact and directly influence the disposition. This ruling protects potential beneficiaries from arbitrary disinheritance driven by mental illness rather than reasoned judgment, potentially leading to more will contests where a testator's seemingly rational, yet unfounded, animosity towards heirs can be challenged by medical evidence of delusion.
