Matson v. Kivimaki
200 N.W.2d 164, 294 Minn. 140, 1972 Minn. LEXIS 1381 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A person cannot recover under Minnesota’s dog-bite statute (Minn. St. 347.22) if they are not lawfully on the dog owner's property, and common-law liability for a domestic animal bite requires proof of the animal's known vicious propensities, not merely provoked playful nips or a reflex action.
Facts:
- Erik Matson, a 2.5-year-old minor, resided with his parents in Roseville, Minnesota, next to the property of Rudolph Kivimaki.
- In 1957, Rudolph Kivimaki constructed a 4-foot high wooden fence that completely enclosed his backyard, installed 6 inches within his property line.
- Rudolph Kivimaki owned a 4-year-old female springer spaniel named Ruffles, which was kept either in his house or his backyard and could not crawl through the fence.
- Erik Matson's parents had expressly told him not to go into Rudolph Kivimaki’s yard.
- Ruffles had previously nipped the hands of Rudolph Kivimaki’s niece in 1967 and nephew in 1968 while they were playing with the dog, causing a scratch in one instance, and Rudolph Kivimaki was aware of these incidents.
- On September 5, 1968, Rudolph Kivimaki’s 14-year-old son, John, observed Erik Matson leaning through the lower boards of Rudolph Kivimaki’s rear fence with approximately half of his body through it.
- John saw Ruffles lying on the ground next to the fence, apparently sleeping, and observed Erik waving his hands in the dog's direction.
- Ruffles jumped up, bit Erik in the face area, and then ran back toward the house.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Erik Matson, a minor, and his father, Robert Matson, brought an action for damages against defendant Rudolph Kivimaki in a trial court.
- The matter was submitted to the jury under instructions that included consideration of Minn. St. 347.22 (the dog-bite statute) and, alternatively, common-law liability.
- The jury returned a general verdict, assessing damages for Erik's injuries and allowing recovery of medical expenses to Robert Matson.
- Defendant Rudolph Kivimaki filed an alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
- The trial court denied Rudolph Kivimaki's motion.
- Defendant Rudolph Kivimaki appealed from the order denying his motion and from the judgment to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Minnesota dog-bite statute (Minn. St. 347.22) apply, and is there common-law liability, when a 2.5-year-old child leans through a fence onto a neighbor's property and is bitten by a dog?
Opinions:
Majority - Todd, Justice
No, Erik Matson was not lawfully on Rudolph Kivimaki's property as required by the statute, and there was insufficient evidence of Ruffles' known vicious propensities to establish common-law liability. The court held that there was no evidence to support a finding that Erik was "lawfully in a place he was entitled to be" at the time of the incident for the purposes of Minn. St. 347.22. The substantial fence constructed by Rudolph Kivimaki clearly manifested an intent to circumscribe his property, keeping others out and providing a private space for his dog. Projecting one's body through such a fence onto another's property does not constitute lawful presence, as illustrated by Fullerton v. Conan, which interpreted a similar statute. Therefore, submitting the statutory liability question to the jury was an error. Regarding common-law liability, the court reiterated that recovery rests on the owner's neglect to restrain an animal known to be vicious. The trial court’s instruction, which improperly adopted an “attractive nuisance” framework by comparing the utility of keeping the dog with the risk to children, was deemed deficient and contrary to Clark v. Brings. Furthermore, the instruction failed to properly guide the jury on determining the dog's viciousness. The prior incidents where Ruffles nipped Rudolph Kivimaki’s niece and nephew were during playtime and were considered provoked, not indicative of a vicious propensity known to the owner, consistent with Clark v. Brings and Erickson v. Bronson. The dog's actions in this case were characterized as a reflex rather than part of a known pattern of vicious conduct. Consequently, the court found no basis for submitting the question of the dog's viciousness to the jury under common law.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the strict interpretation of "lawfully on the premises" for statutory dog bite claims in Minnesota, establishing that physical intrusion through a fence, even by a young child, does not qualify as lawful presence. It also reinforces the high evidentiary bar for establishing common-law liability for domestic animal bites, particularly the requirement of an owner's actual knowledge (scienter) of a truly vicious propensity, distinguishing between minor, provoked incidents and genuinely aggressive behavior. This ruling makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover under either theory if the injured party was technically trespassing or if the animal's prior incidents were minor or provoked, thereby providing greater protection for dog owners against liability in such circumstances.
