Mathews v. United States
485 U.S. 58 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
A defendant in a federal criminal case is entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment whenever there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find entrapment, even if the defendant denies committing one or more elements of the crime charged.
Facts:
- Petitioner Mathews was an employee of the Small Business Administration (SBA) responsible for a program that aided small businesses.
- James DeShazer, the president of a participating business, complained to a government customer that Mathews had repeatedly asked for loans.
- DeShazer believed Mathews was withholding program benefits because DeShazer had not made the requested loans.
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arranged for DeShazer to assist in a sting operation against Mathews.
- Under FBI surveillance, DeShazer offered Mathews a loan that DeShazer claimed Mathews had previously requested.
- Mathews agreed to accept the loan.
- Two months later, DeShazer met Mathews at a restaurant and gave him money, at which point Mathews was immediately arrested.
Procedural Posture:
- Mathews was charged in the United States District Court with accepting a gratuity in exchange for an official act.
- Before trial, the District Court denied Mathews' motion to raise an entrapment defense, ruling he could not do so without admitting to all elements of the charged offense.
- At trial, Mathews testified that he lacked the criminal intent for the crime, and the court refused to instruct the jury on entrapment.
- A jury found Mathews guilty.
- Mathews appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that pleading entrapment is inconsistent per se with the defense that the defendant never had the requisite criminal intent.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a defendant in a federal criminal case have the right to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment even if he denies committing one or more elements of the crime charged?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
Yes. A defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime. The general principle in criminal law is that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on any recognized defense for which there is sufficient evidentiary support. The Court rejected the government's argument that allowing inconsistent defenses would be illogical or encourage perjury, noting that inconsistent defenses are common in other areas of criminal law and are explicitly permitted in civil procedure. A defendant can testify truthfully that he lacked criminal intent, while his attorney argues in the alternative that if the jury finds intent existed, it was induced by the government. The potential for a defendant to lose credibility with the jury by presenting inconsistent theories is a sufficient deterrent against frivolous claims, making a rigid rule prohibiting such defenses unnecessary.
Dissenting - Justice White
No. A defendant should not be permitted to deny committing the elements of a crime while simultaneously arguing that he was entrapped into committing it. The defense of entrapment is unique because it presupposes that the defendant committed all elements of the offense. Therefore, if a defendant testifies that he did not commit the crime (e.g., lacked criminal intent), the entrapment defense is not a plausible alternative legal theory but is a proper defense only if the accused is lying under oath. Allowing such a tactic invites perjury, creates jury confusion, and subverts the trial's core function as a search for truth by permitting a defendant to win acquittal on a rationale he himself states is false.
Concurring - Justice Brennan
Yes. Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to reiterate his long-standing view that the entrapment defense should focus exclusively on the government's conduct rather than the defendant's predisposition. However, acknowledging that the Court has definitively rejected this view in prior cases, he bowed to the principle of stare decisis and joined the majority's reasoning based on established precedent.
Concurring - Justice Scalia
Yes. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, arguing that the alleged inconsistency between denying a crime and claiming entrapment is often purely formal, not genuine. He reasoned that the elements of entrapment (government inducement and lack of predisposition) do not inherently contradict a defendant's claim that he lacked the requisite intent. In cases where a genuine factual inconsistency does exist (e.g., providing an alibi while also claiming entrapment at the scene), the defendant's loss of credibility is a sufficient, self-penalizing check without needing a special rule to prohibit the defense.
Analysis:
This decision resolved a significant circuit split, establishing a uniform federal rule that allows defendants to pursue inconsistent defenses regarding entrapment. It prioritizes the defendant's ability to present every available defense supported by evidence over the government's concerns about logical consistency and potential perjury. The ruling gives criminal defendants greater strategic flexibility, allowing them to argue 'I didn't do it, but if I did, I was entrapped' without being forced to concede guilt to raise the entrapment defense. This aligns criminal defense strategy more closely with the principles of alternative pleading long accepted in civil litigation.
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