Lexplug logoLexplug

Matharu v. Muir

Superior Court of Pennsylvania
86 A.3d 250 (2014)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A physician owes a duty of care to a later-conceived child if a negligent act or omission occurs within the physician-patient relationship with the mother, and the physician should have recognized that the services rendered were necessary for the protection of a third party, such as a future child.


Facts:

  • Jessica A. Matharu (Mother) has Rh-negative blood, while her husband, Baljinder S. Matharu (Father), has Rh-positive blood, a combination that can pose risks to future pregnancies without preventative treatment.
  • In 1997, after the birth of her first child, Mother was correctly administered a RhoGAM injection to prevent Rh sensitization.
  • In 1998, during her second pregnancy, Mother was under the care of Dr. Scott D. Muir and Dr. Fiorina Pellegrino, who failed to administer RhoGAM either during the pregnancy or within 72 hours after the birth of her second child.
  • Shortly after the 1998 birth, Dr. Muir informed Mother and Father that she had become 'sensitized' due to the failure to administer RhoGAM, creating significant risks for any subsequent pregnancies.
  • In 2005, Mother became pregnant with her sixth child, Milan Singh Matharu.
  • Mother was not under the care of Dr. Muir or Dr. Pellegrino during the 2005 pregnancy.
  • Due to complications arising from Mother's Rh sensitization, Milan Singh Matharu required an emergency C-section delivery and died two days later.

Procedural Posture:

  • Baljinder and Jessica Matharu (Appellees) filed a wrongful death and survival action against Dr. Muir, Dr. Pellegrino, and their medical practices (Appellants) in a Pennsylvania trial court.
  • Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing they owed no duty to the deceased child who was not a patient and was not conceived at the time of the alleged negligence.
  • The trial court denied Appellants' motion to dismiss the wrongful death and survival claims.
  • The trial court certified its order for an immediate interlocutory appeal.
  • The Superior Court of Pennsylvania (an intermediate appellate court) granted permission to appeal and an en banc panel affirmed the trial court's order.
  • Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which granted the appeal, vacated the Superior Court's decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Seebold v. Prison Health Serv.

Locked

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does a physician owe a duty of care to a child, not yet conceived at the time of the alleged negligence, for harm resulting from a failure to provide proper medical treatment to the child's mother within the established physician-patient relationship?


Opinions:

Majority - Donohue, J.

Yes. A physician owes a duty of care to a later-conceived child harmed by negligence that occurred within the physician-patient relationship with the mother, when the physician should have recognized the treatment was necessary for the protection of such a third party. This case is distinguishable from Seebold v. Prison Health Serv., which declined to create a new duty for physicians to intervene with third-party non-patients outside the confidential physician-patient relationship. Here, the alleged negligence—the failure to administer RhoGAM—occurred entirely within the confines of the physician-patient relationship between the doctors and the Mother. The court reasoned that the duty falls under Section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as applied in DiMarco and Troxel, because the administration of RhoGAM is a service rendered to the patient (Mother) that is specifically recognized as necessary for the protection of a third party (a future fetus). The claim is not barred by the MCARE Act's seven-year statute of repose, because wrongful death actions are governed by a separate provision, 40 P.S. § 1303.513(d), which establishes a two-year statute of limitations running from the date of death, not the date of the tort.



Analysis:

This decision clarifies the scope of a physician's duty to third parties, affirming that liability can extend to preconception torts. The court narrowly interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Seebold, limiting its application to cases where a plaintiff seeks to impose a duty on a physician to act outside the physician-patient relationship. By grounding its decision in Restatement § 324A, the court reinforced that a physician is liable for foreseeable harm to third parties resulting from negligence committed within the course of treating a patient. This has significant implications for obstetrics and other medical fields where treatment of one person is directly intended to protect another, unconceived party.

G

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Matharu v. Muir (2014)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"