Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court of the United States
501 U.S. 496 (1991)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A deliberate alteration of a public figure's words does not constitute a 'knowing falsehood' for the purposes of establishing actual malice in a libel claim, unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement.

Facts:

Jeffrey Masson, a psychoanalyst, was appointed Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives but was terminated after he publicly criticized Freudian psychology.
Author Janet Malcolm contacted Masson and conducted a series of tape-recorded interviews with him for an article in The New Yorker magazine.
Malcolm's published article and subsequent book portrayed Masson in a highly unflattering light, using extensive, direct quotations attributed to him.
Masson alleged that several key quotations in the article were fabricated or materially altered.
Specifically, the article quoted Masson describing himself as an 'intellectual gigolo,' planning to turn the Freud archives into a place of 'sex, women, fun,' and boasting he was the 'greatest analyst who ever lived.'
The tape recordings of the interviews revealed that Masson had not made these exact statements, although in some cases he had made comments on related subjects.
For example, instead of 'intellectual gigolo,' Masson had stated on tape that archive officials viewed him as a 'private asset but a public liability.'
Malcolm claimed to have additional notes from unrecorded conversations where some of the statements were made, but Masson disputed this.

Procedural Posture:

Jeffrey Masson sued Janet Malcolm, The New Yorker, and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted, concluding Masson had failed to present evidence of actual malice.
Masson (appellant) appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Malcolm and the other defendants (appellees).
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Masson's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision.

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Issue:

Does the First Amendment protect a journalist from a libel claim when they deliberately alter a public figure's words within quotation marks, if the alteration does not result in a material change in the meaning of the statement actually made?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Kennedy

Yes. The First Amendment protects a journalist who deliberately alters a quotation so long as the alteration does not result in a material change in the meaning of the actual statement. The court reasoned that while quotation marks indicate a verbatim reproduction, the First Amendment requires some breathing space for journalism. Minor inaccuracies or corrections for grammar and syntax are not enough to prove actual malice. The proper standard is whether the alteration materially changes the 'gist' or 'sting' of the speaker's remarks. The court rejected the lower court's 'rational interpretation' standard as too permissive for direct quotations, as it would erase the line between a subject's actual words and an author's interpretation. Applying the 'material change in meaning' standard, the court found that five of the six contested quotations were materially different from the taped statements and therefore created a question for a jury regarding actual malice.

Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice White

No. The First Amendment does not protect a journalist who knowingly attributes false words to a speaker. The majority's 'material change in meaning' test is an unnecessary and unworkable addition to the actual malice standard. When a reporter puts words in quotation marks, they are asserting that the person spoke those exact words. If the reporter knows this assertion is false, they have published a 'knowing falsehood,' which is the definition of actual malice under New York Times v. Sullivan. The only remaining question should be whether the false attribution is defamatory under state law, which is a question for the jury. The majority's approach wrongly allows a reporter to 'lie a little, but not too much' and assigns questions of libelous meaning to the court instead of the jury.

Analysis:

This case clarifies the 'actual malice' standard for libel claims by public figures in the specific context of altered quotations. It establishes the 'material change in meaning' test, creating a middle ground between holding journalists strictly liable for any alteration and giving them broad license to fabricate quotes under a 'rational interpretation' theory. This precedent provides a specific analytical framework for future libel cases involving misquotations, requiring courts to compare the published quote with the actual statement to see if the 'gist' or 'sting' has been altered. The decision reinforces the value of quotation marks as indicators of verbatim speech while acknowledging the practical necessities of editing in journalism.

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