Massey v. David
979 So. 2d 931, 2008 WL 878488 (2008)
Rule of Law:
Under Florida's separation of powers, a state statute that imposes procedural requirements for litigation, such as conditions and deadlines for the recovery of expert witness fees, unconstitutionally encroaches upon the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive authority to adopt rules for practice and procedure in all state courts.
Facts:
- Gary Massey entered into a contract with attorney Calvin F. David for representation in connection with injuries allegedly suffered by Massey due to exposure to chemicals released by Beazer East, Inc.
- The contract between Massey and David stipulated that any disputes, including those regarding settlement, would be resolved by a binding arbitrator, Russell Peavyhouse.
- A disagreement arose between Massey and David regarding a possible settlement offer from Beazer East, Inc.
- David submitted the settlement dispute to arbitrator Peavyhouse, who decided that Massey should accept the settlement.
- Contrary to Massey's wishes, David filed a Motion to Approve Settlement with the trial court and allegedly appeared on Massey's behalf at the hearing, advocating for himself and not advising Massey to seek independent counsel.
- The trial court orally granted the Motion to Approve Settlement and directed Massey to sign a written release; Massey discharged David but refused to sign the release.
- David renewed the Motion to Approve Settlement, which the trial court granted, and the arbitrator was subsequently appointed Guardian Ad Litem to sign the release on behalf of Massey, leading to a $795,000 settlement payment.
Procedural Posture:
- Massey initiated a separate legal malpractice action against David.
- The trial court bifurcated the proceedings, with a Phase I trial on negligence and liability issues and a Phase II trial on damages.
- During Phase I, the jury found that David was negligent and that his negligence caused damage to Massey.
- During Phase II, the jury awarded zero damages to Massey.
- Massey sought review of the final judgment entered, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed (Massey III).
- Thereafter, the trial court entered a separate judgment for costs in favor of David.
- Massey sought review of that second judgment from the First District Court of Appeal, alleging the trial court erred in awarding costs for expert witnesses, which he contended was contrary to section 57.071(2) of the Florida Statutes.
- The First District Court of Appeal in Massey II concluded that the trial court did not err because it agreed with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's prior ruling in Estate of Cort v. Broward County Sheriff that section 57.071(2) was an unconstitutional intrusion on the judiciary's powers.
- Massey sought review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Massey II in the Florida Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does Florida Statute section 57.071(2), which requires a written report from an expert witness as a condition for awarding expert witness fees as taxable costs and sets deadlines for its filing, unconstitutionally encroach upon the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive authority to adopt rules for practice and procedure in Florida courts?
Opinions:
Majority - Lewis, C.J.
Yes, Florida Statute section 57.071(2) is unconstitutional because it imposes procedural requirements that infringe upon the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive rulemaking authority for practice and procedure in Florida courts. The Court applied its established guidelines for distinguishing between substantive and procedural law, defining substantive law as that which creates, defines, and regulates rights, and procedural law as the 'machinery of the judicial process' or the steps by which rights are enforced. The majority found section 57.071(2) to be exclusively procedural because it does not create the substantive right to tax expert witness fees (which is established in section 92.231(2)), but merely delineates the steps a party must take to be awarded such fees. The statute's prefatory 'unless' clause and its provision allowing courts to 'otherwise determine' filing times for reports do not establish a substantive right, but rather introduce procedural elements that can be altered by the courts. Furthermore, the statute directly conflicts with existing Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4) (governing discovery of expert information) and 1.525 (governing the award of costs), as well as the Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs, none of which mandate a signed written expert report or similar filing deadlines. The Court referenced its decision in Knealing v. Puleo, where a statute altering time limits for offers of judgment was found purely procedural and thus unconstitutional, distinguishing it from statutes that create or define substantive rights even if they have incidental procedural aspects. The Court also noted legislative history indicating that the Legislature itself questioned whether the act's provisions might encroach upon judicial authority.
Dissenting - Cantero, J.
No, section 57.071(2) is constitutional because its first sentence imposes a substantive condition on the right to taxation of expert witness fees, and its procedural time limits are incidental and necessary to implement this substantive requirement without conflicting with existing procedural rules. Justice Cantero argued that the first sentence, stating that expert witness fees 'may not be awarded as taxable costs unless' a written report is furnished, creates a substantive condition that defines and regulates the right to recover these fees, which is within the Legislature's constitutional prerogative. He emphasized that statutes should be construed as constitutional if possible and that the two relevant statutes, sections 57.071(2) and 92.231(2), should be read in pari materia. While conceding that the second sentence, which sets deadlines for filing the report, is procedural, he contended that these limits are minimal, incidental, and necessary to effectively implement the substantive report requirement. Without time limits, the report requirement would be meaningless. He contrasted this case with Knealing v. Puleo, where the statute was purely procedural, noting that section 57.071(2) contains a substantive condition. Finally, Justice Cantero argued that the statute does not conflict with Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4) because that rule governs pretrial discovery (compulsory disclosure), whereas the statute establishes a condition for the recovery of costs (voluntary disclosure by the party seeking fees). He also found no conflict with Rule 1.525 (governing motions for costs) or the advisory Statewide Uniform Guidelines, as they address different aspects of cost recovery and procedure. He suggested that if the procedural portion were indeed deemed procedural, it should be adopted as a rule of the Court rather than declared unconstitutional.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the strict separation of powers doctrine in Florida, particularly regarding the allocation of authority between the legislative and judicial branches in defining substantive law versus procedural rules. It clarifies that the Legislature cannot dictate the 'how-to' of litigation, even by couching procedural requirements within statutes that touch upon substantive rights. The ruling will likely compel the Florida Legislature to be more circumspect in drafting statutes that have procedural components, ensuring they do not infringe upon the Florida Supreme Court's exclusive rulemaking authority. For law students, this case is a critical illustration of the interplay between constitutional law and civil procedure, highlighting the necessity of distinguishing between rights and the mechanisms for enforcing them when analyzing statutory validity.
