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Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court of United States
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

States have standing to sue the federal government for injuries caused by climate change, such as the loss of sovereign coastal territory. The Clean Air Act grants the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate greenhouse gases as "air pollutants" and requires the agency to ground its decision on whether to regulate in scientific judgment, not unrelated policy considerations.


Facts:

  • A scientific consensus has emerged linking the rise in global temperatures to the increasing concentration of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere.
  • A group of states, including Massachusetts, and private organizations became concerned about the effects of climate change, specifically the rise in sea levels which threatened to cause significant loss of their coastal land.
  • Massachusetts, in its capacity as a sovereign entity, owns a substantial amount of the coastal property that is threatened by these rising sea levels.
  • On October 20, 1999, a group of 19 private organizations filed a formal rulemaking petition with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
  • The petition requested that the EPA regulate emissions of four greenhouse gases—carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons—from new motor vehicles under Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act.
  • The petition asserted that these emissions contributed to climate change, which would have serious adverse effects on public health and the environment.
  • On September 8, 2003, the EPA issued a final order denying the rulemaking petition.
  • The EPA's denial was based on two grounds: that it lacked statutory authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases, and that even if it had authority, it would be unwise to do so for various policy reasons, such as potential interference with foreign policy.

Procedural Posture:

  • A group of private organizations filed a rulemaking petition with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1999, which the EPA denied in 2003.
  • Petitioners, a group of states, local governments, and private organizations led by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, sought review of the EPA's final order in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
  • The Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 split decision, denied the petition for review, holding that the EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion in denying the rulemaking petition.
  • The Supreme Court of the United States granted the petitioners' request for a writ of certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit's decision.

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Issue:

Can the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decline to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act for policy reasons unrelated to whether the emissions endanger public health or welfare?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Stevens

No. The EPA cannot decline to regulate greenhouse gas emissions for policy reasons unrelated to the statutory standard. The Clean Air Act's definition of 'air pollutant' is unambiguous and capacious enough to include greenhouse gases. Because Massachusetts has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its territory from rising sea levels caused by global warming, it is entitled to 'special solicitude' in the standing analysis and has demonstrated concrete injury, causation, and redressability. On the merits, the statute requires the EPA to regulate any air pollutant from new motor vehicles that, in the Administrator's judgment, endangers public health or welfare. This 'judgment' must be based on a scientific assessment of endangerment, not on policy preferences like avoiding a 'piecemeal approach' or concerns about foreign relations. By offering reasons divorced from the statutory text, the EPA's refusal to act was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law.


Dissenting - Chief Justice Roberts

Yes. The petitioners lack Article III standing, and therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to decide the case. The majority invents a new doctrine of 'special solicitude' for states that has no basis in precedent. The alleged injury—loss of coastal land due to global warming—is a generalized grievance, not a concrete and particularized harm. Furthermore, the causal chain linking the EPA's failure to regulate new motor vehicles to Massachusetts's specific land loss is far too speculative. Redressability is equally conjectural, as any minor reduction in U.S. emissions would be dwarfed by increasing emissions from developing nations. This case presents a non-justiciable political question that should be resolved by the elected branches, not the judiciary.


Dissenting - Justice Scalia

Yes. The EPA's decision not to regulate was a valid exercise of its discretion. The Court should have deferred to the EPA's reasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act. The statutory phrase 'in his judgment' grants the Administrator discretion to defer making a decision for valid policy reasons, such as the potential impact on foreign policy and other executive programs. Moreover, the Act's definition of 'air pollutant' as an 'air pollution agent' is ambiguous. The EPA’s interpretation that this term refers to traditional, ground-level pollutants and not to substances with global effects is a permissible one entitled to Chevron deference. The Court improperly substitutes its own policy preferences for the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency.



Analysis:

This landmark decision fundamentally altered environmental law by establishing a pathway for climate change litigation. By granting states 'special solicitude' for standing, it significantly lowered the bar for states to sue the federal government over widespread environmental harms. The ruling confirmed that a major, pre-existing statute could be applied to modern environmental problems not foreseen by its drafters, making the Clean Air Act a primary tool for regulating greenhouse gases. Furthermore, the decision reined in executive agency discretion, mandating that an agency's decision to act or not act must be tethered to the scientific criteria within its authorizing statute, rather than broader, unrelated policy goals of the current administration.

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