Mason v. Adams Cnty. Recorder
901 F.3d 753 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff lacks Article III standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act for the maintenance of historical, unenforceable racially restrictive covenants in public records without alleging a concrete and particularized injury, such as an intent to buy or rent an affected property.
Facts:
- Darryl Mason, an African-American resident of Hamilton County, Ohio, became aware of historical land records maintained by Ohio county recorders.
- These records, recorded between 1922 and 1957, contain racially restrictive covenants prohibiting ownership or occupancy by non-white individuals.
- County recorders are statutorily required to keep and make public all records related to land titles.
- The racially restrictive covenants at issue have been legally unenforceable since the Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer.
- Mason alleged the public availability of these documents created a feeling that he was unwelcome in certain neighborhoods, thereby discouraging him and others from purchasing real estate.
- Mason's complaint did not allege that he was interested in, intended to purchase, or attempted to rent any specific property affected by these covenants.
Procedural Posture:
- Darryl Mason filed a civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court against all 88 Ohio county recorders.
- Mason sought injunctive relief to compel the recorders to stop publishing, remove from public view, and permit redaction of historical documents containing racially restrictive covenants.
- The defendant county recorders filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing Mason lacked standing.
- The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.
- Mason, as Plaintiff-Appellant, appealed the district court's dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff have Article III standing to sue county recorders under the Fair Housing Act for maintaining historical land records containing unenforceable racially restrictive covenants, when the plaintiff alleges only a generalized feeling of being unwelcome and has not alleged any intent to buy or rent a specific property?
Opinions:
Majority - Boggs, Circuit Judge.
No. A plaintiff lacks Article III standing without demonstrating a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact. To satisfy the constitutional minimum for standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Mason failed to allege an injury in fact. He asserted no economic harm, as he never claimed an intent to buy or rent any property. His alleged non-economic harm—a 'feeling that [he is] unwelcome'—is not particularized to him but is rather an 'undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government' shared by the public at large. Citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the court emphasized that an injury must affect the plaintiff in a 'personal and individual way,' which Mason's complaint failed to establish.
Concurring - Clay, Circuit Judge.
No. While concurring in the judgment that the plaintiff failed to plead a legally cognizable injury, this opinion expresses concern with the majority's reasoning. The concurrence argues that historical documents perpetuating discrimination are not immune from modification simply because they are part of our 'living history.' It also cautions against interpreting the majority's opinion to mean that feelings of discomfort from government-ratified discriminatory language could never constitute a particularized injury. Rather, a properly pleaded claim demonstrating how such language caused a specific, personal injury could potentially establish standing in a future case. The key issue here is that this specific plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate such an injury.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the 'injury-in-fact' requirement for standing under the Fair Housing Act, particularly for claims based on non-economic, stigmatic harm. It establishes that a generalized grievance about the existence of offensive but unenforceable historical documents is insufficient without a specific, personal nexus, such as an actual attempt to purchase property in an affected area. This raises the barrier for plaintiffs challenging systemic or historical discrimination, requiring them to translate a general sense of offense or discouragement into a concrete, particularized harm to have their case heard in federal court.
