Marzolf v. Stone

Majority - Durham, Chief Justice

Yes, Washington's rule for negligent infliction of emotional distress does not require a plaintiff to be present at the precise moment of the injury-causing event; it is sufficient to arrive shortly thereafter before the victim's condition or location substantially changes. Additionally, "objective symptomology" for a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim requires that the emotional distress be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through qualified medical evidence, not necessarily physical manifestations. The court reviewed its prior decisions, Hunsley v. Giard and Gain v. Carroll Mill Co. Hunsley established negligent infliction of emotional distress based on general tort principles of duty and foreseeability. Gain narrowed liability, requiring the plaintiff to be "physically present at the scene of the accident or arrive shortly thereafter." The Court of Appeals in Hegel had interpreted this to require direct witnessing of the accident. The Supreme Court rejected this narrow interpretation, emphasizing that Gain's "shortly thereafter" language was not to be ignored. The court reasoned that the emotional trauma stems not merely from witnessing the injury-causing event, but also from observing the immediate aftermath of an accident in all its alarming detail, which can be more shocking than the actual impact. The court adopted an intermediate approach, similar to Connecticut and Wyoming, which recognizes a cause of action where a plaintiff witnesses the victim's injuries at the scene of an accident shortly after it occurs and before there is material change in the attendant circumstances or the victim's condition or location. This rule addresses concerns over limitless liability by allowing recovery only to the class of claimants present at the scene before the horror of the accident has abated. Regarding objective symptomology, the court clarified that Hunsley did not require physical manifestations of emotional distress. It noted that Shoemaker v. St. Joseph Hosp. & Health Care Ctr. incorrectly equated objective symptomology with physical symptoms. The court found that requiring physical manifestations severely and irrationally limits the types of symptoms that would be sufficient to prove a claim, encourages exaggerated pleading, and discounts the reliability of psychiatric testimony. Instead, emotional distress must be susceptible to medical diagnosis and proved through medical evidence. Symptoms such as nightmares, sleep disorders, intrusive memories, fear, and anger may be sufficient if they constitute a diagnosable emotional disorder.