Maryland v. Craig
497 U.S. 836 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which provides a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, is not absolute and may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face meeting if denial of such a confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.
Facts:
- Sandra Ann Craig owned and operated a kindergarten and prekindergarten center which a 6-year-old girl attended from August 1984 to June 1986.
- Craig was subsequently charged with child abuse, sexual offenses, and battery against the 6-year-old girl.
- The State alleged that the child victim and other child witnesses would suffer serious emotional distress if required to testify in the courtroom in Craig's presence.
- Expert testimony presented by the State indicated that testifying in Craig's presence would cause the children severe anxiety, leading them to withdraw, become agitated, or be unable to communicate effectively.
Procedural Posture:
- Sandra Ann Craig was charged in a Maryland state trial court with child abuse and related sexual offenses.
- Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to invoke a statutory procedure allowing the child witnesses to testify via one-way closed-circuit television.
- The trial court held a hearing, heard expert testimony, and granted the State's motion, finding the children would be unable to communicate due to serious emotional distress.
- A jury convicted Craig on all counts.
- Craig appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (the state's intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the convictions.
- Craig then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court), which reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court's finding of necessity was insufficient to overcome the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.
- The State of Maryland successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibit a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant’s physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O’Connor
No. The Confrontation Clause does not categorically prohibit the use of a one-way closed circuit television procedure for a child witness to testify against a defendant in a child abuse case. Although the Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation, this right is not absolute and must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy. A state's interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims is a sufficiently important public policy to justify dispensing with face-to-face confrontation. The procedure is permissible only where the trial court makes a case-specific finding that it is necessary to protect the child from trauma caused by the defendant's presence that would otherwise prevent the child from reasonably communicating. The procedure must also preserve other essential elements of confrontation: testimony under oath, the opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, and the ability of the judge, jury, and defendant to observe the witness's demeanor.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
Yes. The Confrontation Clause categorically prohibits a child witness from testifying outside the defendant's physical presence. The Sixth Amendment guarantees an absolute, irreducible right for the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” which means a face-to-face meeting in court. The majority improperly uses a balancing test, weighing an explicit constitutional guarantee against current public policy preferences. The Court's reliance on hearsay exceptions is misplaced, as those cases deal with the admissibility of out-of-court statements from unavailable witnesses, not with altering the trial procedure for a witness who is present to testify. This decision subordinates the clear text of the Constitution to achieve a desired policy outcome, which is an impermissible mode of judicial interpretation.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that the Confrontation Clause's guarantee of a face-to-face meeting is not a categorical right but a preference that can be overcome by a sufficiently important public policy. By creating a balancing test, the Court moved away from a literal textual interpretation towards a more functional approach focused on the overall reliability of testimony. The case is significant for authorizing special procedures to protect vulnerable witnesses, particularly children in abuse cases, from the trauma of in-court confrontation. This precedent fundamentally alters trial practice in such cases, allowing for testimonial accommodations provided a specific, individualized showing of necessity is made.
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