Marty v. State
786 P.2d 524, 117 Idaho 133, 1989 Ida. LEXIS 159 (1989)
Rule of Law:
Governmental agencies are immune from liability for emergency dam-related actions under I.C. § 42-1717 unless they are owners or operators of the dam, and for discretionary planning activities under I.C. § 6-904(1). The common law doctrine of public necessity has been abrogated by the State Disaster Preparedness Act, which provides a statutory framework for inverse condemnation claims for property damaged during a declared emergency, but exhaustion of administrative remedies under I.C. § 46-1012 is only required if the property's use or destruction was ordered by the governor or a designated representative.
Facts:
- Mud Lake is a terminal basin without a natural drainage outlet, consisting of a diked area and adjacent low-lying farmlands, which had been subjected to periodic flooding prior to the diking efforts in the 1920s.
- On June 3, 1983, Jefferson County declared the Mud Lake area a flood emergency, and on June 6, 1983, the Governor of Idaho declared an extreme emergency due to weakened dikes and the potential for serious flooding.
- Unusually heavy rainfall in the spring of 1984, combined with a saturated water table from 1983, led to an unprecedented flow into the Mud Lake water system.
- In response to the impending flood, governmental agencies, the Army Corps of Engineers, canal companies, water users, and volunteers, coordinated by the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR), undertook various actions including strengthening and increasing the height of the Mud Lake dike, diverting water, capping artesian wells, and cutting ditches.
- On June 12, 1984, Jefferson County declared a state of emergency because of the flooding of land adjacent to Mud Lake, including the landowners' property, with the Governor issuing a similar declaration on June 14, 1984.
- Flooding of the landowners' farmland commenced in April 1984, with water remaining on the lands throughout that year and similar flooding occurring in 1985.
- A 1981 safety inspection report by IDWR concluded that the Mud Lake dike lacked a low-level outlet or spillway capable of passing a 100-year flood but did not conclude it was unsafe, recommending further study.
- In March and April 1984, IDWR directed the flood control district and water district to pump excess water and detain inflow, stressing the primary responsibility of local authorities for flood control.
Procedural Posture:
- In late 1985, the landowners filed suit in a trial court (district court) seeking damages on theories of trespass, strict liability, negligence, and inverse condemnation, and also seeking injunctive relief against various governmental agencies, canal companies, and water users.
- The governmental agencies, canal companies, and water users moved for summary judgment, denying liability and asserting immunity under several Idaho statutes.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, dismissing all of the landowners' claims.
- The landowners appealed the summary judgment decision to the Idaho Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Are landowners entitled to pursue an inverse condemnation claim against governmental agencies for property damaged during a declared flood emergency, or are such claims barred by statutory immunity provisions or a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, particularly where the State Disaster Preparedness Act has abrogated the common law doctrine of public necessity?
Opinions:
Majority - Johnson, Justice
Yes, landowners are entitled to pursue their inverse condemnation claim, as the State Disaster Preparedness Act abrogates the common law doctrine of public necessity but does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies under I.C. § 46-1012 in these circumstances, and thus statutory immunity provisions under I.C. § 46-1017 must be applied by the trial court. However, most governmental agencies, excluding the flood control district, were immune under I.C. § 42-1717, and the flood control district was immune under I.C. § 6-904(1). Canal companies and water users did not breach a duty. First, concerning I.C. § 42-1717 immunity, the State of Idaho, IDWR, and their agents or employees are generally immune from damages caused by measures taken to control or regulate a dam or protect against its failure during an emergency, as the Mud Lake dike qualifies as a 'dam.' While the flood control district, its chairman, the water district, its chairman, and the watermaster were agents of IDWR, the flood control district itself was not immune. The court found sufficient indication that the flood control district acted as an 'owner or operator' of the dike, which falls under an exclusion to the immunity provisions of I.C. § 42-1717. However, the chairman of the flood control district, the water district, and the watermaster were entitled to immunity as there was no evidence they owned or operated the dike. Second, regarding the flood control district's immunity under I.C. § 6-904(1), the trial court correctly characterized the district's actions (shoring dikes, diverting water, managing floodwater accounting) as 'planning activities' or 'policy formation.' These were not routine operational matters but involved considering financial, political, economic, and social effects, thus falling within the discretionary function exception. This immunity prevents judicial re-examination of basic policy decisions. Third, regarding the inverse condemnation claim, landowners were not required to exhaust the administrative remedy provided by I.C. § 46-1012. This statute only applies when the use or destruction of property was 'ordered by the governor or his representative,' which was not the case here, as neither the governor's declaration nor the governmental agencies met this specific requirement. The court acknowledged that the common law doctrine of public necessity, which allowed destruction of property to avert public disaster without compensation, was part of the common law of England adopted in Idaho. However, the Idaho Legislature abrogated this common law doctrine by enacting the State Disaster Preparedness Act (I.C. § 46-1001 et seq.), which provides a statutory framework for disaster response and immunity (I.C. § 46-1017). Therefore, the Act, not common law, governs. The question of whether the landowners suffered 'permanent damage' and whether the governmental actions were taken during periods of declared emergency under I.C. § 46-1017 requires further factual determination by the trial court. Fourth, the canal companies and water users did not breach any duty imposed by I.C. § 42-1204. Storing water in Mud Lake does not make them 'owners' of the Mud Lake dike, and their statutory duty is to maintain their own water conveyance structures, not the dike itself. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the landowners' request for an injunction, as the flooding was attributed to 'unprecedented flood waters'.
Dissenting - Bakes, Chief Justice
No, the landowners were not entitled to pursue their inverse condemnation claim because they failed to exhaust the administrative remedy provided by I.C. § 46-1012. The majority's interpretation of 'representative' of the governor in I.C. § 46-1012(3) is too narrow. The Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) should be considered a 'representative' of the Governor when performing disaster-related duties. The State Disaster Preparedness Act, particularly I.C. § 46-1008(4), grants the governor broad authority during a disaster and envisions delegation of command. Given that the IDWR is part of the executive department and its director is appointed by the Governor with duties including 'such other professional duties as may be required of him by the governor' (I.C. § 42-1706), and remedial duties concerning dams in emergencies (I.C. § 42-1718), the director acts as a representative. Since the governor's proclamation required all state agencies, including IDWR, to take action, the director's actions regarding the emergency fall under the statute. Therefore, landowners should have filed a claim for compensation with the bureau of disaster services under I.C. § 46-1012(4) before pursuing a lawsuit.
Concurring - McDevitt, Justice
Yes, (implicitly agreeing with the majority on inverse condemnation and other points). Justice McDevitt concurred with sections I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the majority opinion. He specially concurred with section IV, which addresses the inverse condemnation claim, specifically noting that the Court's decision did not rely on the interpretation or application of Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 196, note (g). This note discusses how a statute may abrogate the common law privilege of public necessity, which the majority concluded the Idaho Act did.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the landscape of governmental immunity in Idaho, particularly concerning emergency responses to natural disasters. It establishes a critical distinction between different types of governmental actions—identifying when statutory immunity applies to dam operations and when it shields discretionary planning functions. Crucially, the ruling confirms the abrogation of the common law doctrine of public necessity by the State Disaster Preparedness Act, shifting the framework for compensation for property damage during declared emergencies to a statutory basis. Future cases will need to meticulously assess whether governmental actions fall within the specific temporal and operational scope of a declared emergency, whether property damage constitutes 'permanent damage' for inverse condemnation claims, and how narrowly 'gubernatorial representative' is defined to trigger administrative claims processes under the Act.
